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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW TOOLS TO REMEDY ALIEN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Of the substantial burdens confronting aliens upon arrival in the United
States, securing steady employment is perhaps the most crucial. Often, the
aspiration of aliens to take up residence in this country compels them to be-
come financially self-sufficient within a very short period of time, for as the
Supreme Court observed in Truax v. Raich,1 "in ordinary cases they cannot
live where they cannot work. ' 2 Yet aliens have never received equal treat-
ment in the job market. 3 Subjected to situations reminiscent of the historical
discrimination against certain groups of immigrants, aliens are often cate-
gorized, stigmatized, and seldom permitted an equal opportunity to exhibit
work-related skills which may demonstrate abilities consonant with objec-
tively determined employment qualifications. Employed aliens as well as
those seeking employment know that, in reality, objectively determined job
qualifications rarely exist. Not infrequently, work assignments, wage rates,
seniority lists and advancement opportunities are determined with an eye
toward the alien's lack of citizenship. 4 Further, very little time is consumed
1. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
2. Id. at 42. While nullifying an Arizona law which prohibited employers from hir-
ing aliens to comprise more than 20 percent of their work force because of its repug-
nance to the fourteenth amendment, the Court in Truax further noted that "[ilt re-
quires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupa-
tions of the community is of the very essence of . . .personal freedom and opportunity
. Id. at 41.
3. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 98 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See also Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the
Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. Pirr. L. REV. 499 (1974).
4. See Packinghouse Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 903 (1969). The court, in concluding that the employer's policy and practice
constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of race and alienage, quoted approv-
ingly from the trial examiner's opinion: "It is clear on this record, and I conclude, that
the only reason Respondent [employer] paid Ruiz $1.50 an hour for seven months while
was [sic] doing a $1.80 job which five or six Anglos were concurrently paid $1.80 for
performing, was because Respondent considered Ruiz and other minority employees as
docile, cheap, labor, and in order to keep them in this condition of servitude." Id. at
1138.
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before a newly employed alien discovers that the employer is not alone at
fault or perhaps even primarily to blame for discriminatory conditions. For
it is often the certified bargaining representative, usually a union, the histori-
cal champion of workers' rights, which complacently ignores or even pro-
motes the employer's discriminatory treatment of alien employees or job
applicants by negotiating discriminatory contract provisions or by unrea-
sonably refusing to prosecute alien employee complaints through grievance
machinery fabricated by the collective bargaining agreement." But such mis-
treatment, whether initiated by the employer or the union or both at once,
need not go uncorrected, as alien employees and applicants for employment
may utilize various effective legal channels to combat employment dis-
crimination.6
Recently, however, the Supreme Court deprived aliens of the sanctuary of
one of the legislative schemes most frequently used by minority groups to
remedy employment discrimination. In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
Co.,7 the Court declared that an employer's decision not to employ a person
because he or she is not a United States citizen does not constitute employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Aliens, no longer within the guardianship of
Title VII, are therefore more easily susceptible to discriminatory treatment
by unions and employers.
The purpose of this article is to examine the National Labor Relations Act
[NLRA]9 as a fertile source of potential relief for alien employment dis-
5. See NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974); De-
Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
6. The considerable protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144) have been applied to remedy alien
discrimination charges. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 344 U.S. 410
(1948). In an opinion which established that classifications based on alienage, like
those based on race, are inherently suspect and subject to close scrutiny, the Supreme
Court, in referring to section 1981, observed that "[t]he protection of this statute has
been held to extend to aliens as well as to citizens." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 377 (1971). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have extended section 1981 to private discrimination in em-
ployment. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974)
(alien employment discrimination). The courts have utilized section 1981 to combat
racial discrimination in employment in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491
F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1973), Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), and
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970). See Larson, The De-
velopment of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employ-
ment, 7 HARv. Civ. Rioirrs-CQv. LiB. L. Rnv. 56 (1972); Das, supra note 3.
7. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-17 (1970).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
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crimination. The discussion will focus primarily on the pronouncements and
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board whose function as a guaran-
tor of equal employment opportunity has yet to be fully explored. Initially,
examination of the NLRA as it reflects national labor policy through the in-
auguration of the collective bargaining process as well as the Board's respon-
sibility to supervise union and employee conduct in connection with collective
bargaining is called for. While exploring the duty of unions to represent in-
dividual employees fairly-a duty which has traditionally been enforced by
the courts and, to a lesser extent, the Board in specialized circumstances-
this article will concentrate primarily upon Board procedures for allevi-
ating employment discrimination. These procedures subdivide naturally into
a cluster of remedial devices which spring from the Board's role as overseer
of representation elections and from the Board's authority to penalize
unions and employers who engage in egregious discriminatory conduct con-
stituting unfair labor practices which violate section 8 of the Act.' 0
I. MINORITY PROTECTIONS EMBEDDED IN THE CONCEPTS
OF MAJORITY RULE AND THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The NLRA was originally conceived to encourage "the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and [to protect] the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."'" It was
Congress' belief that industrial peace and consequent productivity could be
achieved and maintained only by statutorily promoting a roughly equivalent
power allocation between labor and management through the vehicle of col-
lective bargaining. 12  This congressional rationale, sanctioning a clash of
"equals" in the collective bargaining arena, was reinforced by judicial accept-
ance in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'s While certifying the consti-
tutionality of the NLRA in Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court reiterated
its view of the need for labor organizations:
[T]hey were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that
a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of
10. Id. § 158.
11. id. § 151.
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) (em-
ployer does not commit unfair labor practice by insisting on bargaining over a manage-
ment functions clause); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (19 37)
(upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA).
13. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
1975]
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himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the
employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was
essential to give laborers an opportunity to deal on an equality
,[sic] with their employer. 14
To further assure that labor organizations could realistically achieve a posi-
tion of bargaining power equal to that of the employer, Congress included sec-
tion 9(a) in the NLRA which provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. .... 15
Section 9(a) is vital to the congressional scheme of collective bargaining. It
sanctions the concept of majority rule of workers within appropriate bar-
gaining units to create a superimposed dimension of unity. It then invests the
bargaining representative of this "unified" group of workers with the sover-
eign power to act as an exclusive bargaining agent for the members of the
designated bargaining unit. Although an employee may not want to be
represented by -the majority union, following the recognition of the union by
the employer or its certification by the National Labor Relations Board he
or she no longer has the power to negotiate an individual employment con-
tract with the employer. 16 Even though an individual employee may be able
to successfully negotiate a more favorable contract, his or her wages, hours,
work assignments, and other vital conditions of employment are determined
by an agreement concluded by the employer and a union against which the
employee may have voted. 7 Similarly, as long as a bargaining representa-
14. Id. at 33, relying on American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Coun-
cil, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
16. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). The Board labeled the refusal
of management in J.I. Case to negotiate with the certified bargaining representative on
matters which were covered in individual contracts an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(a) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court enforced the Board's decision.
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their exe-
cution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the pro-
cedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective
bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly ascertained
bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or
condition the terms of the collective agreement.
Id. at 337. See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Re-
sponsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1332-33 (1958).
17. [A]dvantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as
disadvantages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with organization and
[Vol. 24:509
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tive has been voluntarily recognized by the employer or certified by Board
action, the employer may not seek to negotiate individual contracts directly
with the employees--even with a mathematical majority of them.18 National
labor policy was constructed on the premise that employees will secure the
most advantageous means of bargaining for improvements in the terms and
conditions of their employment by consolidating their economic strength and
acting through a bargaining representative freely chosen by a majority of the
employees. This policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's
capacity to determine his or her individual relations with the employer and
authorizes the certified bargaining representative to act in 'the interest of all
employees. The bargaining representative alone is empowered to negotiate
with the employer to establish terms and conditions of employment. During
this process, the union may decide to press certain issues while deferring or
trading off others for employer concessions. The individual employee may
dispute these union decisions but he is bound by them.19
Like all newly hired employees, aliens hired by an employer whose work
force is represented by a recognized or certified bargaining agent become sus-
ceptible to the arithmocracy of the current majority of union members,
whether or not they become active union members. Unless the alien em-
ployees' interests conform precisely with the concerns of the union's majority,
their interests in union or employer conduct relative to the terms and condi-
tions of their employment may quietly be smothered to protect the collec-
tive interests of the membership majority. Therefore, alien employees are
often in an unfortunately vulnerable position because they are forced to deal
with two powerful hierarchies, which are themselves mutual adversaries,
neither of which can be fully trusted to promote alien interests. It is not
surprising, -then, that alien employee grievances or proposed contract pro-
visions favorable -to aliens may be ignored in disputes over majority sanc-
tioned demands or traded off as bargaining chips for an employer's offer
which is more attractive to the union leadership.20 Aliens who experience
choice of representatives; increased compensation, if individually deserved, is
often earned at the cost of breaking down some other standard thought to be
for the welfare of the group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at
the long-range expense of the group as a whole.
321 U.S. at 338-39.
18. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); cf. NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
350 (1958).
19. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975), discussed pp. 552-54 infra; NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 180 (1967).
20. See Longshoremen's Local 13 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 101-6 (1972) (union violated its duty of fair repre-
1975]
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employment discrimination in hiring 21 or on the job which results from action
or inaction by -the employer or union, separately or in collusion, may look
to the NLRA as the source of effective antidotes for employment discrimina-
tion.
If it is to survive constitutional attack, the imposing power of exclusive
representation granted labor organizations in the NLRA to augment the func-
tioning of the collective bargaining process must be tempered by fairness to
individual employees. The necessary restraint upon union power is im-
plemented by the duty of fair representation. 22  The duty of labor organiza-
tions to represent individual employees fairly, which is implicit in the exclu-
sive representation language of section 9(a) of the NLRA, comprises a fun-
damental component of the right of employees to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing.2 8 Aliens, victimized by employment
sentation when it "swapped" a contract provision interpretation which resulted in dis-
charge of an employee for employer's concession on proper manner of preshipment
packing).
21. Rights conferred upon active employees by the Act are customarily extended to
applicants for employment. See NLRB v. Houston Maritime Ass'n, 337 F.2d 333 (5th
Cir. 1964) (right to be referred to available positions by union hiring hall without pay-
ing a percentage of wages for this service which union employees received without
charge); NLRB v. Stratford Furniture Corp., 202 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953) (right to
engage in union organizational activities); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB,
191 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (right not to be refused employment where applicant
testified at certification hearing of union which he helped to organize and later filed
unfair labor practice charges against employer).
22. See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure,
51 TEx. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV.
601 (1956); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Feller,
A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663
(1973); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1962); Wellington, supra note 16.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The proviso to section 9(a) authorizes employees
to present their own grievances to the employer without first going through union chan-
nels. It merely gives the employees the privilege of presenting grievances to the em-
ployer without placing any statutory obligation upon the employer to resolve the com-
plaint. Frequently, while endeavoring to adjust the employees' grievances, the employer
will be compelled to analyze important contract provisions. The employer's conclusions,
drawn from this analysis, will not only govern the resolution of the complaint, but will
also constitute an implicit unilateral interpretation of the contract provisions which,
though favorable to the individual grievant, may nevertheless be inimical to the compre-
hensive interests of the majority of union members. Largely because such conduct could
easily create severe animosity between unions and employers, the courts have prudently
avoided relying on the section 9(a) proviso. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 228 (6th Cir.
1966); Broniman v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1965);
Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 1963); Black-Clawson
Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1962).
Professor Cox concurs in the courts' circumscribed view of the section 9(a) proviso:
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discrimination facilitated by the union, may file charges against the union
for violating the duty of fair representation by its improper action or inaction.
The duty of fair representation requires rational union conduct without en-
couraging unnecessary interference with the union's vital representative func-
tion. This notion was initially articulated by the Supreme Court in Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad24 where the Court declared that invidious
employment discrimination based on race is an irremissible breach of the
duty of fair representation. Although the majority of the bargaining unit
employees is legislatively authorized to elect the bargaining representative,
the Court admonished that the bargaining agent, once chosen, has a conse-
quent legislative duty to exercise its power fairly on behalf of all members
of the bargaining unit. More specifically, the Court directed the unions to
consider requests of nonunion members and to express minority views to the
employer during collective bargaining, as well as to protect fully the interests
of the minority in their chosen occupation. 25 The duty of fair representation
therefore compels the union "to represent nonunion or minority union mem-
bers . . . without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith.",26 However, the duty of fair representation is not violated by purely in-
cidental unequal treatment. Unions and employers may have a legitimate ra-
tionale for differentiating among individual employees where variations in skill,
experience, job difficulty, and similar factors exist.2 7 For this reason a union
may be justified in either refusing, or acquiescing in, the employer's refusal
to assign non-English-speaking but otherwise fully qualified aliens to posi-
tions in which they must deal with the general public on a daily basis. The
Supreme Court alluded to the flexibility of the standard of review to be ap-
plied to union conduct in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman: "A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serv-
ing the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty
of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. '28
"In my opinion, therefore, section 9(a) is entirely consistent with the view that an em-
ployer may lawfully promise the union not to process individual grievances and may also
give the union the only legal right to compromise or enforce substantive obligations."
Cox, supra note 22, at 624. See Comment Federal Protection of Individual Rights
Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
24. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
25. Id. at 201-04. Just as collective bargaining is a continuing process, the union's
duty of fair representation extends over the life of the contract to the day to day admin-
istration and adjustment of the contract and other work rules, the resolution of new
problems not covered by the current contract, and the proper use of grievance procedures
to protect employees' rights secured by the contract. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 46 (1957).
26. 323 U.S. at 204.
27. See id. at 203.
28. 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
1975]
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While it is commonly accepted that unions may not act unfavorably toward
an individual employee or group of employees with positive bad motives such
as those reflected in racial discrimination, 29 personal hostility,80 or discrimina-
tion against nonmembers,8 1 a standard against which to measure less perni-
cious conduct is not so clearly discernible. Aliens, for example, are subject
to subtle forms of employment discrimination such as unenthusiastic prosecu-
tion of alien employees' grievances. If one analyzes such union conduct
merely for the presence of a fatal bad move, it may well fall within the "wide
range of reasonableness"; although the union's decision not to take the griev-
ance to arbitration may be unjustified, objective bad faith under these cir-
cumstances may be impossible to prove. The Supreme Court in Humphrey
v. Moore3 2 began to explore the idea of expanding the duty of fair represen-
tation to include affirmative union responsibilities. Although the Court ob-
served in Humphrey that the union had made its decision to dovetail the
seniority lists of two merging trucking companies honestly and in good faith,
the Court rested its approval of the union action equally upon its finding that
"the union acted upon wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or
arbitrary factors."' 8
The Court's conclusion in Humphrey, that unions must avoid arbitrary
conduct toward individual employees, was further amplified by its decision
in Vaca v. Sipes.8 4 The Vaca Court insisted that the "statutory authority
to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation
to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward
any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct."'38  The Court, while demonstrating its continued al-
legiance to the Steele prohibition of hostile discrimination and the good faith
requirement of Huffman, explicitly added a third distinct obligation to refrain
from arbitrary conduct. Vaca makes it clear that a demonstrable bad motive
is no longer the only avenue available for proving that the union has
29. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
30. See Longshoremen's Local 13 v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir.
1971); Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959).
31. Unions breach the duty of fair representation by favoring union members over
nonmembers in contract bargaining or processing grievances. See Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 313 U.S.
192 (1944); NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 413 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Plumbers
Local 38, 388 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1968); Steelworkers Local 937, 200 N.L.R.B. 40
(1972); Port Drum Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 555 (1968).
32. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
33. Id. at 350.
34. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
35. Id. at 177.
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breached its duty of fair representation. The union may also fail to meet
its obligation to individual employees by acting unfavorably towards them
without reason or with merely a frivolous reason or by arbitrarily ignoring
a meritorious grievance or processing it in a perfunctory manner.3 6 Although
individual employees do not have an absolute right to have their complaints
taken to arbitration, the union, if it declines to process the grievance, must
have a legitimate reason grounded in a conscientious review of the merits of
each grievance.3 7  But if the union processes individual employee complaints
in an equitable fashion, the Court provides it with a measure of protection
by prohibiting a trial court from declaring a breach of the duty based merely
upon its own opinion that the underlying grievance was meritorious. 38
Presumably the Court in Vaca was directing trial courts to focus their at-
tention solely upon the reasonableness of the method employed by the union
in deciding whether to take an employee grievance to arbitration, rather than
upon the allegations of the underlying complaint itself. This notion has been
borne out by several recent circuit court decisions. The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores
Packinghouse3 9 concluded that the union's decision not to take several sen-
iority grievances to arbitration because of its assumption that the grievances
would be settled by a previously filed unfair labor practice complaint was
not evidence of subjective bad faith. Nevertheless, the court held that the
union's failure to investigate or make any informed judgment concerning the
merits of the grievance demonstrated an arbitrary and perfunctory handling
of the complaints in a manner inconsistent with the union's fair representa-
tion obligations recognized in Vaca.40
36. See id. at 191. In one of the most recent preemption cases, Amalgamated Ass'n
of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), the Court unfortunately
muddled the effort of Vaca to propound workable standards to be employed in measur-
ing union conduct toward individual employees. There the Court, while discussing the
applicability of the preemption doctrine to fair representation cases, stated that any at-
tempt to demonstrate that a union has breached its duty of fair representation "carries
with it the need to adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional,
severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives." Id. at 301. Certainly the applica-
tion of such a standard to fair representation cases would nullify the Vaca Court's caveat
requiring unions to avoid arbitrary conduct whenever the interests of individual em-
ployees are involved. However, it is unlikely that the Court intended to obliterate the
Vaca standards or restructure the rationale of the Huffman and Humphrey decisions.
The central issue in the case was preemption, making the statement about the duty of
fair representation dictum, and neither the dissent of Justice Douglas nor that of Jus-
tice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Vaca, intimates that the Lockridge deci-
sion in any way disfigures the Vaca standards.
37. See 386 U.S. at 194.
38. See id. at 192-93.
39. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 284. Two years later the First Circuit affirmed a district court opinion
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
Similarly, in Griffin v. UA W, 41 a Fourth Circuit panel reviewed a jury
award accorded an employee who had been discharged for fighting with his
supervisor at a hockey game. Judge Sobeloff observed that the union's in-
sistence on filing the discharge grievance with the same supervisor with whom
the employee had fought was unjustified. Such a method of processing the
grievance was held to be "the equivalent of arbitrarily ignoring the grievance
or handling it in a perfunctory manner."' 42 The court further stated:
Without any hostile motive of discrimination and in complete good
faith, a union may nevertheless pursue a course of action or in-
action that is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute a viola-
tion of the duty of fair representation. A union may refuse to
process a grievance or handle the grievance in a particular manner
for a multitude of reasons, but it may not do so without reason,
merely at the whim of someone exercising union authority. 4
Finally, in Retana v. Elevator Operators Local 14,44 a Spanish-speaking
employee appealed the trial court's dismissal of her wrongful discharge action
in which she alleged that the union had violated its duty of fair representation
by (1) failing to provide a bilingual liaison between the union and its
Spanish-speaking members, (2) failing to provide them with a copy of the
collective bargaining agreement in Spanish, (3) neglecting to inform Spanish-
speaking members of their right to have the union process a grievance in their
behalf and (4) declining to promote the establishment of a bilingual super-
visory system. The Ninth Circuit reinstated the employee's claim, observing
that the union could well have defaulted on its duty to fairly represent the
Spanish-speaking employees by depriving them "'of an opportunity to partic-
which sanctioned a union refusal to arbitrate the grievances of an employee who had
been discharged for stealing meat from the food store where he worked. The trial court
found that the union, before deciding not to process the complaint unless the grievant
paid the expenses, had interviewed employee witnesses, examined statements, met with
the employer, and consulted the union's attorney during a complete investigation of the
underlying incident. The court held that the question before it was "not whether in fact
Sarnelli stole the property of Stop & Shop, but whether the representatives of Local 33
conducted a reasonable investigation in his behalf in order to determine whether or not
to process his case to arbitration." Sarnelli v. Meat Cutters Local 33, 333 F. Supp. 228
(D. Mass. 1971), afj'd, 457 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1972).
41. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 184.
43. Id. at 183. See also Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.
1973); Price v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972); Seay v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970); St. Clair v. Teamsters Local
515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969); Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968).
44. 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972).
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ipate either in the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract or in the
enjoyment of its benefits by a language barrier which union officials ex-
ploited, or took no steps to overcome. ' 45
Whenever a union takes action as an exclusive bargaining agent, whether
in its role as contract negotiator or administrator, it must do so reasonably
and in good faith. If its decision is grounded in rational considerations, inci-
dental discrimination will be tolerated to promote the general interests of the
bargaining unit.46 If it conducts a thorough investigation in good faith before
deciding not to process an employee grievance, it will not be held liable even
if a court later rules that the grievance was meritorious.47 But whenever a
union participates in classifying a group such as aliens for disparate treatment
or refuses to process their meritorious grievances, the union's rationale for
taking such action must -be carefully examined. If the union conduct has no
empirical justification or if it is perfunctory or arbitrary in nature, the union
has failed to fairly represent the alien employees even though its action was
beneficial to the majority of employees. Similarly, if the union's rationale is
frivolous, it will not support unequal treatment and may have been con-
structed simply to conceal impermissible motives such as personal hostility.
The duty of fair representation is designed to protect minority employee
groups from subtle as well as hostile employment discrimination, and proof
of a breach of this duty creates a claim through which alien employees may
either seek judicial relief or petition the Board to invoke any of the several
remedial measures made available to it by the Act. 48
45. Id. at 1024. A Second Circuit panel recently found that a union had exploited
a complex reclassification scheme to deprive bargaining unit members of their rightful
seniority positions. While not directing the union to dovetail seniority lists whenever
two groups of employees are consolidated, the court declared that, in determining senior-
ity among the bargaining unit employees, unions must not only refrain from bad faith
conduct but must also implement their duty of fair representation by providing sufficient
safeguards for the rights of minority unit members. Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
495 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. Proof that a union acted negligently in processing or dismissing an employee's
grievance has been considered insufficient to support a violation of the duty of fair rep-
resentation. See Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 952 (1971); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970);
Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194-95 (1967).
48. Of course, jurisdictional issues in duty of fair representation cases require an ex-
tensive analysis of the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine including a thorough ex-
amination of the Court's puzzling discussion of preemption theory as applied to fair rep-
resentation cases in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971), which is not within the scope of this Comment. For an extensive analysis, see
Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51
TEx. L. REv. 1037 (1973).
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II. REMEDIAL MEASURES WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF THE BOARD
A. The Authority to Superintend the Election and Certification of
Exclusive Bargaining Representatives
In addition to promulgating the concept of exclusive representation and
the coordinate responsibility of fair representation, section 9 of the NLRA
49
authorizes the Board to conduct and supervise representative elections and
to determine whether or not to certify a successful union as the exclusive
representative of an appropriate bargaining unit.50 If after the election re-
sults are certified, the employer refuses to recognize or bargain with the
Board's endorsed representative, the Board is empowered to issue an order
compelling the employer to bargain with the newly certified union in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 9(a).51 Most unions, especially in their
nascent stages, rely substantially upon this watchdog role which the Board as-
sumes in conducting representative elections and in assuring the unions' func-
tional existence as exclusive bargaining representatives. Such union reliance
upon the plenary authority of the Board augments the Board's arsenal of
alien employment discrimination remedies.
52
49. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). Section 9 directs that the representative chosen by a
majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall 'be the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of those employees, This section also establishes procedures for de-
termining appropriate bargaining units and conducting representation elections.
50. See id. § 159(b); 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 35-36 (1948). The Board's re-
sponsibility under section 9(b) is to "decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subsection, the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining shall 'be the em-
ployer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof." Over the years the Board has
formulated several criteria which it applies to determine all questions concerning the ap-
propriate bargaining unit. The foremost of the established considerations is the rule
that "employees with similar interests shall be placed in the same bargaining unit."
Chrysler Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 55 (1948). In addition to the mutuality of interest, the
Board gives great weight to the history of collective bargaining in the particular plant
or industry involved in resolving issues of geographic scope, the general character of the
proper bargaining unit, or the occupational categories of employees to be included in
the unit. 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 35-36 (1948).
51. Following certification by the Board, if the employer rejects the union's demand
to bargain over a collective agreement, the union may file an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1970). The Board, upon finding the charge to be meritorious, may then issue an af-
firmative order for the employer to bargain. However, if the employer wishes to chal-
lenge the certification by appealing the Board's decision to the courts, and if the objec-
tions are "fairly debatable" rather than frivolous and were not made in bad faith, the
bargaining order will not become final until all opportunities for judicial review have
been exhausted. See Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 86 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1974);
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. When a union, lacking sufficient strength to deal profitably with the employer,
relies on the Board to force the employer to the bargaining table, the Board has the
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If aliens are to receive even the most rudimentary protection, supervision
of union and employer conduct must begin during the election period prior
to Board certification. Customarily the Board requires that elections be held
only in an atmosphere in which all employees are free from restraint, coer-
cion and undue influence from either the employer or the union.53 "In elec-
tion proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as pos-
sible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees."' 54  Unlike the
adjudication of an unfair labor practice charge, assigning responsibility for
the disruption of an election is not an issue when the Board rules on chal-
lenges to the validity of an election. "When, in the rare extreme case, the
standard drops too low, because of [the Board's] fault or that of others,
the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment must be
conducted over again." 55  The standard need not descend to the level at
which it could constitute an unfair labor practice. Conduct much less severe
than the equivalent of an unfair labor practice will destroy the "laboratory
conditions" and will prevent the employees from making an absolutely free
choice. 56
consequent opportunity to discourage union employment discrimination by denying its
protective orders to an intractable union which cannot function without them.
53. See NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Div., 379 F.2d 172, 180 (6th
Cir. 1967). (Board order enforced which set aside an election because the employer, in
establishing new work rules immediately prior to the election, conferred benefits on
some employees which interfered with their free choice). See also Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp.,
344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d
273 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing various types of pre-election conduct which are directly
coercive or could reasonably be so construed by employees).
54. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). The Board's role in the elec-
tion process was comprehensively described in Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70
(1962):
Our function, as we see it, is to conduct elections in which the employees
have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in
an atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise,
free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but
also from other elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice.
See also NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
309 U.S. 206 (1940).
55. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
56. See Haynes Satellite Co., Div. of Union Carbide Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 95 (1962);
Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962) (employer misrepresentations);
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962) (inflammatory employer election propa-
ganda); Alamo Express, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 89 (1960) (employer threats); Heintz Div.,
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960) (deceptive union campaign tactics). In
Dal-Tex Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), the Board condemned the disparity in treat-
ment of an employer's preelection statements depending upon whether they are chal-
lenged in the context of a representation or unfair labor practice proceeding:
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Appeals to racial prejudice were vigorously condemned by the Board in
Sewell Manufacturing Co.57 as injecting an irrelevant component into the
election atmosphere which was highly destructive of the purpose of an elec-
tion.6 8  The Board declared that appeals to racial prejudice on matters un-
related to the election create intolerable conditions which make rational, well
informed exercise of the election franchise impossible. 59 However, the Board
refrained from censuring all references to race by sanctioning each partici-
pant's truthful representations of the opponent's position on racial issues
which did not "deliberately seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings
by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals."' 0 The Board is attentive to election
challenges alleging appeals to racial considerations and will carefully scrutin-
Conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes
with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election. This is so
because the test of conduct which may interfere with the "laboratory condi-
tions" for an election is considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct
which amounts to interference, restraint, or coercion which violates Section 8
(a)(1).
Id. at 1786-87. Additionally, section 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970),
generally known as the "employer's free speech" provision, has been thought to protect
employer's electioneering statements. See NRLB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967). However, in NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir.
1968), a First Circuit panel declared that although a series of election statements were
themselves not illegal per se, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances of a pend-
ing election their coercive nature "interfered with the employees' exercise of a free and
untrammeled choice in the election." Id. at 161. The Sinclair approach was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), where the
Court established guidelines for preelection employee speeches. The Court in Gissel
observed that any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression must be made
in the context of the specific setting in which it occurs so as to balance the employer's
free speech rights with the rights of employees under section 7. To this end, the Court
stated that while an employer is free to communicate any of his general or specific views
about a particular union, the statement may not include a "threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit." Id. at 618. Additionally, the employer may not rely on section
8(c) to legitimize his predictions as to the effects of unionization on the company unless
they are precise, based on objective fact and reflect "'what he reasonably believes will
be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control.' " Id.
at 619, quoting NLRB v. River Tags, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967).
57. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
58. id. at 71.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 72. See Archer Laundry Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965); Aristocrat
Linen Supply Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1965). The Board validated election results in
these cases despite the employers' objections because it found the unions' appeals to
black workers, based on a message of racial equality, to be relevant to election issues
without being inflammatory. In NLRB v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 387 F.2d 744 (4th
Cir. 1967), the court found temperately phrased letters and speeches which exhorted
black employees to vote for the union to be germane to election issues without exacer-
bating racial prejudices, despite the purely racial character of the union message.
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ize the evidence of preelection conduct for signs of purely inflammatory ra-
cial propaganda. If such flagrant racial theatrics are found to have occurred
during the critical period preceding the election, 6 ' it will be set aside and re-
scheduled by the Board at the request of the challenging party.
2
The Board's "laboratory conditions" standard applies to all elec-
tions and it may be disrupted by misbehavior other than racial incidents.68
Certainly an election coinciding with inflammatory appeals to alienage preju-
dice would as effectively destroy the "laboratory conditions" as provocation
based on race prejudice. Alien workers, like black workers, represent a
group easily distinguishable from white, native born workers; hence, with
little effort aliens can be subjected to the intemperate, irrational prejudices
of other employees. "Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete
and insular' minority," as the Supreme Court observed in Graham v. Richard-
son.64  The Court has therefore established that "classification based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny." 65  Unquestionably then, to be consistent
with Graham, the Board, when presented with election challenges supported
by allegations of inflammatory appeals to alienage prejudice, should evaluate
the objections in a manner commensurate with the Sewell criteria. If the
Board concludes that the allegations have a rational basis in fact, it should
invalidate the election and reschedule it for a later time. Although setting
aside an election in which one party has manipulated the result by exploiting
irrelevant issues of alienage will hardly eliminate any inbred bias against
alien workers, it will help create an atmosphere in which alien workers are
free to make their interests known and in which all members of the bar-
gaining unit may make an intelligent, well informed choice concerning the
question of union representation.
61. The critical preelection period during which misconduct by either party will re-
sult in the invalidation of the election commences with the filing of the petition. See
National Car Corp. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 796, 809 (7th Cir. 1967); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453, 454 (1962).
62. See 138 N.L.R.B. at 71. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (1974) directs that only a party
may file objections to an election. See also Shoreline Enterprises of America, 114
N.L.R.B. 716, 717 n.1 (1955); Association of Motion Picture Producers, Inc., 88
N.L.R.B. 521, n.6 (1950).
63. See note 56 supra.
64. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Court in Graham struck down as violative of
equal protection two state statutes which denied welfare benefits to resident aliens who
had not resided in the country for a specified number of years.
65. Id. at 371-72. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
where the Court, after noting that the fourteenth amendment protects aliens, invalidated
a California law which barred aliens from obtaining commercial fishing licenses because
they failed to meet a citizenship requirement.
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
Traditionally, once the question of union representation is resolved in favor
of a union by a valid election, and challenges sponsored by other participants
are overruled, the Board certifies the bargaining unit's choice as the exclusive
bargaining representative of that unit.66 Board certification provides a statu-
tory cloak of authority and protection which few labor organizations can
achieve on their own. Not only does a certified bargaining representative
have the sole authority to negotiate for the entire bargaining unit, it is further
insulated by the Act's prohibition of a subsequent election for twelve
months. 7 Additionally, once the union has successfully negotiated a bar-
gaining agreement, in most circumstances the contract operates as a
bar to a rival's election petition for up to three years."" However, a union
which unlawfully discriminates is not furnished with such comprehensive pro-
tection.
In Pioneer Bus Co.,69 the Board confronted the question of whether
or not the Board's promulgated "contract bar rule" 70 could be asserted to
shelter a union which engaged in separate representation treatment along ra-
cial lines. The Board declared that it would not permit its contract bar rules
to be utilized to shield contracts which were executed on the basis of race
from the submission of appropriate election petitions. The Board empha-
sized that it would not enforce its contract bar rule to preserve any contract
which discriminated between black and white employees on racial lines.7 '
66. Objections to the victorious union's certification grounded in allegations of invidi-
ous discrimination will be heard by the Board during a precertification hearing. See
the discussion of the Board's decision in Bekins Moving and Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B.
No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974), pp. 527-30 infra.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970) provides: "No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period,
a valid election shall have been held."
68. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). See also NLRB v. Bums
Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 290 n.12 (1972); Penn-Keystone Realty Corp.,
191 N.L.R.B. 800, 802 (1971); General Dynamics Corp., Ponoma Div., 175 N.L.R.B.
1022, 1023 (1969).
69. 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
70. In its Twenty-Eighth Annual Report, the Board articulated its view of the con-
tract bar rule:
The Board has adhered to a policy of not directing an election among em-
ployees currently covered by a valid collective-bargaining agreement, except
under certain circumstances. The question whether a present election is barred
by an outstanding contract is determined according to the Board's contract-bar
rules. Generally, these rules require that a contract asserted as a bar be in
writing, properly executed, and binding on the parties; that the contract be in
effect for no more than a "reasonable" period; and that the contract contain
substantive terms and conditions of employment which are consistent with the
policies of the Act.
28 NLRB ANN. REP. 48 (1963).
71. 140 N.L.R.B. at 55. See also Swisher & Son, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 85
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Contracts which are negotiated and executed in a manner which discriminates
between aliens and native employees simply on the basis of citizenship
should, by a parity of reasoning, receive similar treatment by the Board. As
with racial discrimination, no legitimate rationale exists to support enforce-
ment of ,the contract bar rule as a sanctuary for unions which refuse to inte-
grate their representational treatment of citizen and noncitizen employees in
all matters affecting employment.
The Board closed its opinion in Pioneer Bus with a warning that the execu-
tion of a racially discriminatory contract was in "patent derogation" of Board
certification and "would warrant revocation of the certification." 72  Pioneer
Bus was not, however, the first instance of threatened certification revocation.
In two previous cases, the Board refrained from revoking certification when
the union voluntarily relinquished its certification following the institution of
revocation proceedings, 73 and when, in the second case, a union gave rea-
sonable assurances that definite measures would be taken immediately to re-
form its conduct. 74  When the union in the latter case, however, failed to
heed fully the Board's admonition by continuing to engage in discriminatory
treatment of black nonmembers, the Board did not capitulate. Nine years
after the Board's initial warning the employees were still represented by two
locals of the same union, each totally segregated by race. Local 2, whose
membership was comprised of black employees, filed a petition with the
Board to rescind the joint certification, charging that Local 1 (white members
only) refused to represent properly black employees in grievance procedures
L.R.R.M. 1280 (1974), where the Board refused to apply its contract bar rule and di-
rected an election in a bargaining unit which was represented by two locals established
along racial lines with separate executive boards, bargaining committees, and grievance
procedures.
72. 140 N.L.R.B. at 55.
73. See Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945), in which a rival union chal-
lenged the certified representative because its locals were segregated 'by race.
74. See Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953), in which a rival union sought
decertification of the incumbent union because its locals were segregated by race, and
because the white local charged each member of the black local $15 for each grievance
filed and $400 for each arbitration proceeding while not charging the members of the
white local for exercise of the same privileges. The Board in A.O. Smith Corp., 119
N.L.R.B. 621 (1957), did rescind certification for six months because the union had
failed to represent properly eighteen clerical workers included in the designated bar-
gaining unit. Also, the certification of Inside Glass Workers Local 642 was revoked by
the Board in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955), because the union
and employer had engaged in a policy of bargaining for union members only: "The
Board wishes to make it clear that it will not countenance the flagrant disregard for its
certification by an avowed policy on the part of the certified bargaining representative
to represent its members only rather than all employees in the bargaining unit." Id.
at 1213.
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and discriminated against them merely because they were black.75 Both the
trial examiner and a unanimous Board agreed that revocation of the joint
certification was appropriate because the certified local executed contracts
grounded in irrelevant considerations of race and administered the contracts
in a manner which perpetuated racial discrimination in employment. 76 A
three member majority of the Board further elaborated that based on fifth
amendment considerations the Board could not legitimately "render aid under
Section 9 of the Act to a labor organization which discriminates racially when
acting as a statutory bargaining representative. ' 77 Additionally, the majority
asserted that revocation becomes a suitable remedy where two separate certi-
fied locals determine membership eligibility totally on the basis of race. 78
Although loss of certification, like deprivation of the contract bar rule, may
be potentially devastating to a devitalized union,79 absent a viable rival the
union may nevertheless be able to function well without 'the Board's patron-
age. Also, the Board only employs its decertification strategy in circum-
stances typified by notorious misbehavior such as in Hughes Tool Co. While
continuing to threaten revocation, 0 the Board has actually rescinded union
certification in only two instances. The first occurred in United States Bak-
ing Co.,"' where the union had divided the bargaining unit into two separate
subunits solely on the basis of sex, even though both groups worked side by
side on the same assembly line operation, performing virtually identical
jobs.82 The second revocation occurred in Teamsters Local 671. 83 There
the union not only refused to bargain for a group of part-time, nonmember
warehousemen within the bargaining unit, it also coerced the employer to fire
the part-time employees and replace them with full-time warehousemen by
threatening to call a strike of the other full-time employees. 84 The Board
75. Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
76. Id. at 1577.
77. Id. For this proposition, the Board cited Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), discussed
notes 89 & 98 infra.
78. 147 N.L.R.B. at 1577.
79. For example, the Independent Metal Workers, whose certification was revoked
by the Board in Hughes Tool Co., lost an election in the Hughes bargaining unit
it had represented for more than twenty years. See Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Rep-
resentation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REv. 771, 783 n.56 (1965).
80. The Board has warned that certification is subject to revocation when the union
fails to comply with its statutory duty to represent all unit employees. See American
Mailing Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 246, 247 (1972); Gino Morena Enterprises, 181 N.L.R.B.
808 (1970); Alto Plastics Mfg. Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 850, 854 (1962).
81. 165 N.L.R.B. 951 (1967).
82. See id. at 952.
83. 199 N.L.R.B. 994 (1972).
84. Id. at 999-1001.
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concluded in each case that revocation was appropriate because the union
had failed to represent properly all members of the designated bargaining
unit as required by their certification. Based on these decisions, the Board
could effectively utilize its decertification prerogatives when it is alerted to
the policies of a union which denies full membership to aliens while segre-
gating them from other workers and refusing to bargain or process grievances
on their behalf.
Rather than revoking a collective bargaining representative's certification,
the 'Board in mid-1974 embarked upon a new scheme of reviewing union
conduct prior to certification which bears strategic remedial potential for alien
employment discrimination. This pivotal advancement in the Board's senti-
ment was articulated in the majority opinion in Bekins Moving & Storage
Co.85 The employer in Bekins filed a motion seeking to dismiss the
election petition of a Teamsters local on the grounds that the union engaged
in invidious discrimination on the basis of sex, alienage and national origin.
A three member majority of the Board declared that the Board is constitu-
tionally foreclosed from certifying a bargaining representative which discrim-
inates on the basis of race, alienage or national origin.8 6 Also, the majority
announced that the merits of an employer's allegations of union discrimina-
tion would be considered prior to the issuance of Board certification but only
subsequent -to an election in which the union has been successful a 7 The es-
sence of these conclusions was embodied in the majority's judgment that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibits the Board from con-
ferring the benefits of certification upon a labor union which has been shown
to be engaged in a "pattern and practice of invidious discrimination.
88
Member Kennedy, concurring in the result, contended that federal certifica-
tion of a union which excludes employees from membership on the basis of
85. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
86. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325. The majority declined to authorize a review of union con-
duct for discriminatory practices based on sex. Member Kennedy, noting that the
Equal Rights Amendment has yet to be ratified, was unable to find Supreme Court
precedent which included sex among the previously established suspect classifications of
race, alienage and national origin. Therefore, while agreeing that employment discrim-
ination based on sex may establish a breach of the duty of fair representation in a post-
certification proceeding, he refused to regard precertification allegations of sex discrimi-
nation as a constitutional issue.
87. Id. The Board reaffirmed its policy of expediting elections so that the employ-
ees' wishes can be determined without undue delay and employers are prevented from
interposing insubstantial pre-election objections to gain additional time to undermine the
union.
88. Id. The majority observed that the fifth amendment forbids the Board as an
"arm" of the federal government from participation in invidiously discriminatory con-
duct.
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race, alienage or national origin would constitute an unconstitutional ratifica-
tion of private discrimination."s
This determination, however, represents the extent of the majority's agree-
ment on the power of the Board to entertain objections to certification based
upon discriminatory union conduct. Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins
would have modified the majority's position so as to require a precertification
inquiry as to a union's willingness and capacity to fairly represent all employ-
ees in the bargaining unit on an equal basis regardless of their membership
status. They contended that the duty of fair representation has a constitu-
tional foundation which obligates the Board to determine whether or not the
union has a demonstrable propensity to fulfill its duty to fairly represent all
employees before certification is appropriate or constitutionally permissible. 90
Thus Messrs. Miller and Jenkins asserted that the Board does not lack "the
statutory power to withhold the certification, but rather the constitutional
power to confer it." 91 However, the notion that the duty of fair representa-
tion is a constitutional imperative was unacceptable to Board Member Ken-
nedy who argued that the obligation is imposed by statute as a corollary to
the authority conferred by section 9(a)92 to function as an exclusive bargain-
ing agent. Accordingly, because he contended that the duty of fair repre-
sentation accrues only upon statutory certification, Member Kennedy would
defer any examination of a union's default on this obligation until after cer-
tification has been issued.
93
The dissenters, Members Fanning and Penello, with some diffidence
evaded a definitive analysis of the fair representation issue in denouncing the
89. Id. at 1329. Board Member Kennedy relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which declared that racial segregation in the
public schools of the District of Columbia was a denial of due process of law guaranteed
by the fifth amendment.
90. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326.
91. Id. at 1325. Chairman Miller and Board Member Jenkins found support for
their position in the Fifth Circuit's statement in Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966): "Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that any statute
purporting to bestow upon a union the exclusive right to represent all employees would
be unconstitutional if it failed to impose upon the union this reciprocal duty of fair rep-
resentation." Id. at 17, citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99
(1944).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
93. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331 (Member Kennedy, concurring). In his discussion of the
origin of the duty of fair representation, Board Member Kennedy pointed to language
from several Supreme Court decisions involving issues of fair representation. Each of
the opinions from which he extracted quotations refers to the union's "statutory duty" to
fairly represent all employees in collective bargaining and contract enforcement. See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944).
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majority's primary conclusion that certification should be denied discrimi-
nating labor organizations. Withholding certification in such circumstances,
the dissenters believed, is neither constitutionally mandated nor sanctioned
by the NLRA and will potentially disrupt federal enforcement of the anti-
discrimination provisions of Title VII. 94  They were, however, unable to
marshal the support of any major authority to fortify their condemnation of
the majority's constitutional rationale for denying certification to discrimi-
nating unions. They blithely sidestepped the constitutional issue by urging
that immediate certification would place minority group employees in a posi-
tion either to eliminate discriminatory policies from within or to petition the
Board or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to apply
a post-certification remedy.95 The dissenters also referred to the language of
section 9(c) of the NLRA, which provides that the Board "shall direct an
election" and "shall certify the results thereof."96 Such language, they main-
tained, is mandatory and requires the Board to certify, without exception, any
union which has won a Board directed election.97 Again, however, Members
Fanning and Penello failed to reconcile their sentiments with the omnipresent
requisites of the fifth amendment's due process clause, which the Supreme
Court has invoked to prohibit federal agencies from implicitly sanctioning dis-
criminatory practices of private organizations despite the compulsory tenor
of any legislative instruction.
98
The potential benefits flowing to aliens from Bekins are easily discernible
from the Board's conclusion that it is constitutionally prohibited from certify-
ing a union which discriminates against aliens. Nevertheless, the efficacy of
this new anti-discrimination procedure depends completely upon the
standards which the 'Board promulgates and the manner in which they are
applied during a precertification review of union behavior. Although the
94. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)-(e)(17) (1970).
95. Members Fanning and Penello suggested that since employees are individually
permitted to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board or unfair employ-
ment practice complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, they
will be fully protected by federal supervision of the union-employee relationships
after the allegedly discriminatory union is certified. To the majority such a no-
tion was somewhat anomalous because it provides "the discriminator with a further
opportunity to discriminate in order that [the Board] may better hold him ac-
countable for his actions, a bit like inviting the fox into the chicken coop to have
a better opportunity to watch him." 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326 (Members Fanning & Penello,
dissenting).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
97. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1333-34 (Members Fanning & Penello, dissenting).
98. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), discussed note 89 supra; Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (power of federal courts subject to federal policy against
protecting private discriminatory conduct).
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Board has taken several opportunities to employ the Bekins rationale in
declaring that an employer's allegation of discriminatory union policies is
beyond the scope of a pre-election hearing,99 at this juncture the Board has
only twice been presented with postelection challenges to certification. In
the first of these decisions, issued on the same day as Bekins, the dissenters
in Bekins, joined by Member Kennedy, refused to deny certification to a
union alleged to have engaged in sex discrimination. 1'0
A second case marking the Board's development of this innovative ap-
proach, Grants Furniture Plaza,1 1 is more instructive, for it displays the
manner in which challenges to certification subsequent to an election will be
reviewed. The original Bekins majority, with Member Kennedy again con-
curring, ruled that an employer's allegations of union discrimination against
women and Spanish-surnamed individuals, which were supported by statisti-
cal data and included a copy of a Department of Justice complaint accusing
the union of perpetuating prior discriminatory practices against blacks as well
as Spanish-surnamed individuals, failed to prove sufficient facts to justify a
refusal to certify the union. 1 2 The standard fabricated by the Grants ma-
jority is unquestionably rigorous. Before it will withhold certification the
Board must be convinced by "affirmative evidence of a factual nature" consti-
.tuting "prima facie factual proof" of discriminatory union behavior.' 08
Neither the Department of Justice complaints nor the employer's statistical
data proferred such dynamic evidence. The Grants majority declared that
the challenging employer must, as a prerequisite to denial of certification,
demonstrate factually that the union, through a hiring hall or other means,
exercises control "over the racial, sexual, or ethnic composition of those who
enter the work force and, thus, those who become its members."' 104  In the
99. See S.H. Kress & Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 86 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1974); Petrie
Stores Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 86 L.R.R.M. 1509 (1974) (unions alleged to have
engaged in race discrimination); Defender Security Serv., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 86
L.R.R.M. 1490 (1974); Alden Press, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 86 L.R.R.M. 1605
(1974) (unions alleged to have engaged in sex discrimination); Capitol City, Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. No. 52, 86 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1974) (type of union discrimination alleged is not
specified).
100. See Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974). Mem-
ber Kennedy based his opinion upon the rationale explicated in his Bekins concurrence.
See note 86 supra.
101. 213 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 87 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
102. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1176. Members Fanning and Penello concurred in the certifica-
tion of the union for reasons expressed in their Bekins dissent.
103. Id.
104. Id. When the employer is unable to provide such convincing evidence, the ma-
jority declared that the Board will infer that the employers in the area exercise the ac-
tual control over the ethnic, racial and sexual composition of the work force. Id.
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absence of such factual evidence, the majority asserted that the Board will
not countenance any inferences of a union's propensity to engage in employ-
ment discrimination and will thereby deny the employer's allegations.' 05
Although individual aliens cannot challenge the election of a union which
treats them unfavorably and thereby block the union's certification, 10 6 they
may rely, in most cases, on the employer to make such a challenge. When
an employer realizes that a union's discriminatory conduct may forestall his
obligation to bargain with it, the employer may well become an overnight
champion of the employment-related interests of aliens in the designated bar-
gaining unit. Even though the employer may be acting partially or totally
upon personal motivation, aliens' interests may be enhanced because unions
which face a certification struggle will be inspired to reorient their perspective
on the proper treatment of aliens. 10 7 While Bekins puts the carrot on the
stick, Grants, in putting the employer to a more strenuous proof, lengthens
the stick. But the enticement survives with enough vitality to ensure that
employers may find it to their own advantage to protect the interests of aliens
while endeavoring at the same time to promote their own.
The stringent standards established by the Board in Bekins for precertifica-
tion reviews of union discriminatory conduct are a thoughtful and prescient
response to the far less rigorous criteria articulated by the Eighth Circuit in
NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.10 8 In Mansion House,
a contentious anti-union employer refused to bargain with Local 115 of the
Brotherhood of Painters upon its presentation of union authorization cards
signed by a majority of the painters employed by Mansion House Corpo-
ration.10 9 Subsequently, the employer fired all the painters for such im-
105. Id.
106. See note 62 supra.
107. The amount of protection aliens can expect to receive as a result of such a pre-
certification skirmish clearly depends upon how essential Board certification is to the
survival of the discriminating union. If the union has the support of a formidable ma-
jority of employees, it may be able to force the employer to bargain without the Board's
assistance and therefore continue to discriminate against aliens without interruption.
108. 190 N.L.R.B. 437 (1971), enforcement denied, 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
See Leslie, Governmental Action and Standing: NLRB Certification of Discriminatory
Unions, 1974 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35 (1974).
109. The Board concluded that a remedial bargaining order was appropriate under
the standards delineated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Pri-
marily, bargaining orders are issued by the Board after a union has been certified but
the employer unjustifiably refuses to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970). However, in Gissel the Supreme Court held that the duty to bar-
gain may arise independently of the formal certification process upon the presentation
of union authorization cards. Furthermore, a bargaining order is the appropriate
remedy where an employer rejects a card majority while at the same time committing
unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union's majority and make a fair elec-
tion impossible.
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pertinent reasons that the Board decided to issue a bargaining order, among
other measures, to remedy the employer's conduct. The employer argued
against the issuance of a bargaining order by alleging that the union's mem-
bership policies discriminated against black painters. The trial examiner, with
the Board's approval, refused to consider the employer's evidence of race dis-
crimination. However, an Eighth Circuit panel, upon the Board's petition
for enforcement, condemned the Board for refusing to examine the employ-
er's evidence and rejected enforcement of the bargaining order. Speaking for
the unanimous panel, Judge Lay declared that the Board, in requiring a chal-
lenging employer to demonstrate the actual practice of discrimination, had
applied the wrong standard when deciding ,the issue of certification in the face
of racial discrimination allegations. 110 The court directed the Board to em-
ploy a less rigorous measure of proof in discrimination cases. Modeling its
approach upon the procedure often utilized in Title VII cases,"' the court
asserted that the Board should consider geographical statistical data and evi-
dence of past discriminatory practices as crucial factors in ascertaining
whether or not sufficient evidence exists to create a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.' 2 Upon presentation of statistical evidence which corrobo-
rates other evidence of past racial discrimination, the court admonished the
Board to conduct its own investigation of the union's admission procedures,
application methods and similar membership policies and to "'inquire whether
the union has taken the initiative to affirmatively undo its discriminatory
practices.""11 Since the Board, in rejecting the employer's evidence, did not
employ these less restrictive criteria, the court refused enforcement of the
bargaining order. The court asserted that nonenforcement of the bargaining
order was necessary in this case to prevent the remedial machinery of the
NLRA from benefiting a union which engaged in racial discrimination.1
4
The Eighth Circuit's Mansion House doctrine, if subscribed to by other cir-
cuits, presents yet another potential hurdle which a union that discriminates
against aliens must clear before the collective bargaining relationship contem-
plated by the NLRA reaches fruition. However, it seems clear from Bekins
that the Board will not synchronize its standard of proof in reviewing chal-
lenges to certification with the criteria prompted by the Eighth Circuit in
Mansion House. The irreconcilability of the two judgments is more evident
110. 473 F.2d at 475.
111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970).
112. 473 F.2d at 476. The Eighth Circuit panel -relied on its own decision in
Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div., 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), as
an example of the proper method of resolving allegations of unfair employment practices
in Title VII cases.




after examining the conflicting policies which influence the persuasion of each
forum. The Board, for instance, has always highly regarded the policy of
permitting employees to exercise an unfettered choice in deciding issues of
representation." 5 To facilitate the designation of employee representatives,
the Board has established election procedures designed to expeditiously certify
labor unions selected by employees to represent them.116 Furthermore, this
policy dovetails with another which seeks to avoid unnecessary delays in
establishing the parties' duty to bargain during which a truculent employer
may severely undermine the union's support among employees or its bargain-
ing position. Thus, the Board in Bekins prohibited the consideration of alle-
gations of union misconduct in the treatment of minorities until after the
election.
Balanced against these factors designed to insulate unions from detrimental
employer conduct is the countervailing policy of constitutional dimension
which prohibits agencies of the federal government from facilitating private
discrimination based on race, alienage or national origin. The Mansion
House court, while seeking to promote the constitutional requirement, sub-
verted the Board's policy of quickly establishing the parties' duty to bargain
to a degree which is potentially inimical to implementation of the union's
function in the collective bargaining process. In refusing to enforce the
Board's bargaining order which was prompted by serious pre-election em-
ployer misconduct, the court in Mansion House gives the employer a signifi-
cant advantage-time to destroy the union's majority status before it is of-
ficially recognized in an election supervised by the Board. In contrast, the
Board, while recognizing its constitutional obligation to refrain from certi-
fying a union which engages in invidious discrimination against employees,
undertakes a well balanced position. By requiring employers to meet a more
stringent standard of proof in a post-election hearing, the Board precludes
attempts by employers to circumvent their duty to bargain with the statutory
representatives of their employees by filing groundless objections to certifica-
tion. The Bekins-Grants rationale will indemnify unions against purely dila-
tory employer tactics, while authorizing a denial of certification in legitimate,
well documented instances of discriminatory behavior by unions which have
won representation elections.
B. Unfair Labor Practices
Aliens who have been victimized by employment discrimination may, as
charging parties, file unfair labor practice charges with the Board against bar-
115. See nn. 53 & 54 & p. 521 supra.
116. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329 (Member Kennedy, concurring).
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gaining representatives or both employers and bargaining representatives
simultaneously.' 1 A distinct advantage of successfully prosecuting an unfair
labor practice charge is that the Board is authorized by section 19(c) of the
NLRA l"8 to take affirmative action against the offending party by ordering
such reparations as reinstatement of the aggrieved employee with back pay
and full seniority rights, and other remedial measures. Alien employees, as
aggrieved parties, may be compensated for the harm suffered from interfer-
ence with their job rights if it can be shown that the employer or bargaining
representative has engaged in employment discrimination in a manner pro-
hibited by section 8 of the Act." 9 The primary dilemma is to identify the
type of alien employment discrimination which section 8 was to proscribe.
1. Nonperformance of the Duty of Fair Representation as an Unfair
Labor Practice. The Board's initial enforcement of the judicially recognized
duty of fair representation occurred in Miranda Fuel Co.,1 20 a case in which
there were no issues of employment discrimination based upon race, alienage,
sex, national origin or lack of union membership. The aggrieved party in
Miranda, Michael Lopuch, received permission from the employer to depart
on an extended leave of absence three days early. Shortly after his return
to work, Lopuch was dropped to the bottom of the seniority list by the em-
ployer at the insistence of the union because of his early departure. In the
unfair labor practice action which followed, the Board recognized that the
privilege of acting as an exclusive bargaining representative, derived from
section 9 of the NLRA, 12' necessarily included the obligation to fairly repre-
sent all members of the bargaining unit. Furthermore, the Board declared
that the section 7122 right of employees "to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of -their own choosing" extends to the employees "the right to be
117. See, e.g., Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
118. Section 19(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), provides: "The Board . . . shall is-
sue . . . an order requiring [the offending party] to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter ... "
119. Section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) identifies employer or union conduct which
constitutes unfair labor practices under the Act.
120. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides: "Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
122. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities .... "
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free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bar-
gaining agent in matters affecting their employment."' 123 Since the union's
discriminatory treatment of Lopuch constituted a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation which consequently hampered Lopuch's exercise of his
section 7 rights, the Board declared that the union conduct violated section
8(b)(1)(A). 124 Similarly, because the employer acquiesced in the union's
discriminatory conduct, it too was responsible for interfering with Lopuch's
section 7 rights and so was held to have violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. 1 25 The dissenting Board members and the majority of -the Second Cir-
cuit panel, which refused to enforce the Miranda holding,126 rejected the no-
tion that the duty of fair representation is incorporated among the section
7 rights of employees or that sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A), which were
designed to protect section 7 rights, were violated by the union's conduct.
Congress, the Board dissenters asserted, furnished a remedy in the courts for
a breach of the duty of fair representation which made unwarranted any such
extension of the Board's authority.
127
Uninhibited by the dissenters' objections, the majority augmented their
holding by finding that the union and employer violated section 8(b)(2) 28
123. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . .. ."
125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ...."
126. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Without reaching a majority conclusion on the
issue of whether or not a union's unfair representation constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice, Judge Medina and Chief Judge Lumbard agreed that the conduct of the union and
the employer did not violate sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) because their actions were
"wholly unrelated to the affected employee's relationship with the union." id. at 180
(Lumbard, C.J., concurring). Judge Medina refused to recognize the alleged section 8
(b)(1)(A) violation on the grounds that the Board had overextended the scope of its
surveillance, raising potentially severe preemption problems. Chief Judge Lumbard found
the Board's evidence of hostility and unfair treatment was insufficient for the court even
to consider whether invidious conduct in violating the duty of fair representation may
also violate section 8(b)(1) (A). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Friendly argued that
the Board's judgment against the union under section 8(b) (2) and against the employer
under section 8(a) (3) should have been sustained. Instead of relying on the Board's
duty of fair representation analysis, Judge Friendly concluded that the union's conduct
might tend to encourage membership in any labor organization or at the very least in-
struct the bad or indifferent members to become good members. The Board, he main-
tained, could lawfully conclude that the unjustifiable demotion of any employee would
encourage or discourage membership in a union in violation of sections 8(b) (2) and
8(a)(3). Id. at 180-86 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
127. 140 N.L.R.B. at 200-02.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
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and section 8(a)(3),'129 respectively. Noting that an 8(b)(2) violation
stems from union conduct which causes or attempts to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee so as to encourage or discourage union
membership, the Board concluded that the foreseeable result of the union's
mistreatment of Lopuch would encourage union membership among non-
members and intimidate current union members in such a way as to en-
courage them to become "good" union members.' 30 This conclusion oc-
casioned an even more caustic response from the dissenting members.
Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning asserted that the majority's
analysis overlooked the literal language of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3)
which, in addition to requiring discriminatory treatment of certain employees,
compelled the Board to find that the employer's conduct at the behest of the
union actually encouraged or discouraged membership, not merely that it
exhibited such a potential.' 3 ' The simple fact that the union had the power
under the contract to determine the seniority rights of the employees may
be sufficient to create an inference of bad motive, but such an inference was
not tantamount to the production of actual proof. The dissenters referred
to the Supreme Court's opinion in Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB 13 2 in which
the Court observed that evidence of the "true purpose" or "real motive" con-
stitutes the test of an 8(b)(2) violation. 133 The union's action against Lo-
puch, who was a union member, benefited all the employees who rose one
notch on the seniority scale whether or not they were union members. In
concluding, the dissenters asserted that the absence of actual evidence of dis-
parate treatment between members and nonmembers as a result of the
union's conduct prohibited the Board from finding that union membership
for a labor organization or its agents-(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization .... "
130. 140 N.L.R.B. at 186-87. In reaching this conclusion the majority relied on the
rationale of Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). In Radio Officers
the Supreme Court affirmed that sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to permit
employees to freely exercise their rights to join or not to join unions and to be good,
bad or indifferent members. These sections, the Court stated, proscribe conduct which
encourages members to remain in good standing with the union. 347 U.S. at 40-42.
131. 140 N.L.R.B. at 193-94.
132. 365 U.S. 667 (1962).
133. Id. at 675. In his concurring opinion in Local 357, Justice Harlan agreed that
an "affirmative showing of a motivation" to encourage or discourage union membership




was encouraged or discouraged in violation of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)
(3).134
Despite the Second Circuit's unenthusiastic reception of the Miranda de-
cision, 135 the Miranda majority on the Board continued to chaperone union
conduct to enforce the duty of fair representation. In Metal Workers Local
1, 31, the Board was confronted with an unfair labor practice allegation and
a challenge to the union's certification. The same Board members who com-
prised the majority in Miranda agreed with the trial examiner that the union,
by failing to consider in any fashion the grievance filed by a black bargaining
unit member alleging discrimination based on race, violated sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA.13 7  Faced with evidence of an
egregious breach of the duty of fair representation, 138 the Board authorized the
addition of a third rationale to fortify the protective configuration of Miranda
by holding that the union had breached its duty to bargain, in violation of
section 8(b)(3). 139 A refusal to process a meritorious grievance, the trial
examiner noted, is the equivalent of a refusal to bargain. The duty to bar-
gain, he asserted, is an obligation which the union owes to the members of
the bargaining unit as well as to the employer. Hence, in adopting a policy
of prosecuting only members' grievances, the union has contravened its re-
sponsibility to bargain on behalf of all bargaining unit members.
1 40
134. In its Twenty-Third Annual Report, the Board discussed the proper application
of section 8 (a) (3) to conduct which discriminates against protected activities.
To support a finding that section 8(a) (3) has been violated, the record in the
case must show that the complaining employees were in fact discriminated
against because of activities protected by section 7 of the act and that the dis-
crimination tended to encourage or discourage union membership.
NLRB, TWENTY-THiRD ANNUAL REP. 63-64 (1959) (emphasis added). The Board went
on to explain that an employer cannot be found to violate section 8(a) (3) unless inde-
pendent evidence exists to establish that the employer intended to discourage the exercise
of section 7 rights. Id. at 64-70. Simply stated, the Board's position precludes the appli-
cation of sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) unless it can be demonstrated that the employer,
having been coerced by the union, altered an employee's work status because he exer-
cised his section 7 rights either to engage in concerted activities or to refuse to engage
in such activities.
135. See note 126 supra.
136. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
137. Id. at 1574.
138. See pp. 514-19 supra.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents-(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an em-
ployer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 159(a) of this title ....
140. See 147 N.L.R.B. at 1604. While further explicating its section 8(b)(3) theory
in Longshoremen's Local 1367, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), the Board suggested that the
provisions of section 8(d) obligate employers and unions to "confer in good faith" to
produce lawful agreements:
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In addition to reiterating the objections to the majority's 8(b)(1)(A)-
8(b)(2) thesis which were elucidated in their Miranda dissent, Chairman
McCulloch and Member Fanning found the 8(b)(3) theory equally unsa-
vory. The legislative history of section 8(b) (3), the dissenters maintained,
demonstrated conclusively that the section was designed to function as a
counterpart to section 8(a)(5),14 1 which limits the employer's bargaining
duty entirely to the union.1 42  Since section 8(d), which defines the duty to
bargain, refers to the "mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith,' ' 143 the dissenters concluded that section 8(b)(3) describes a union's
obligation to bargain owed to employers and not to employees. 144
Notwithstanding their criticism of the majority's position, the dissenting
members did concur in finding a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) upon a
more restricted rationale. Instead of resting their judgment upon the non-
performance of the duty of fair representation, the dissenters were convinced
that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) simply by refusing to process
Because collective-bargaining agreements which discriminate invidiously are
not lawful under the Act, the good faith requirements of Section 8(d) neces-
sarily protect employees from infringement of their rights; and both unions and
employers are enjoined by the Act from entering into contractual terms which
offend such rights . . . . Section 8(d) cannot mean that a union can be exer-
cising good faith toward an employer while simultaneously acting in bad faith
toward employees in regard to the same matters .... We conclude that
when a statutory representative negotiates a contract in breach of the duty
which it owes to employees to represent all of them fairly and without invidi-
ous discrimination, the representative cannot 'be said to have negotiated the sort
of agreement envisioned by Section 8(d) nor to have bargained in good faith
as to the employees whom It represents or toward the employer.
Id. at 899-900.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
142. The dissenting members referred to a House Conference Report which in com-
menting on section 8(b) (3) stated: "This provision . . . imposed upon labor organiza-
tions the same duty to bargain which under section 8(a) (5) . . . was imposed on em-
ployers." 147 N.L.R.B. at 1593, quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1947).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession ....
144. 147 N.L.R.B. at 1591-93.
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an employee's grievance because of his nonmembership, irrespective of the
union's racial motivation for denying the employee an opportunity to become
a full member.145 The majority, in replying to this diagnosis, posed a hypo-
thetical situation which illuminates the central conflict in the differing per-
suasions. Does a bargaining representative, with an integrated membership
which refuses on racial grounds, as distinguished from membership grounds,
to process the meritorious grievance of a black member in an effort to keep
black employees in inferior jobs, violate section 8(b)(1)(A)? 146  Since a
union member in such circumstances is not being discriminated against on
the invidious basis of nonmembership, the dissent would find no 8(b)(1)
(A) violation. The majority, however, having woven the duty of fair repre-
sentation into the section 7 scheme, declared that refusal to process a griev-
ance on racial grounds alone contravenes the union's obligation to fairly
represent all employees in the bargaining unit and therefore restrains or
coerces employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.
The Miranda-Hughes majority's section 8(b)(1)(A) consensus received
judicial endorsement from two Fifth Circuit panels in Rubber Workers Local
12 v. NLRB 147 and NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1367.148 Local 12, the
statutory representative in the former case, refused to process the grievances
of several black employees who had been laid off for extensive periods while
white workers with less seniority remained on the job and while new white
applicants were hired by the employer. In the second case, Local 1367, which
admitted only white longshoremen to its membership, maintained and en-
forced a 75-25 percent work distribution contract provision based on race and
union membership between its own members and those of a sister local com-
posed entirely of black members. Additionally, Local 1367 maintained an
arrangement which forbade the assignment of white and black gangs to the
same ship hatches.
In both cases the Board declared that the unions involved failed to com-
ply with their duty as exclusive bargaining representatives to represent fairly
all members of the bargaining unit in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A)."'
Based on the Hughes Tool Co. rationale, the Board also concluded that
the union's discriminatory conduct violated sections 8(b)(2) and (3).
Without reaching the 8(b)(2) and (3) issues, the Fifth Circuit panels en-
145. See id. at 1584-90.
146. See id. at 1575.
147. 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
148. 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
149. See Rubber Workers Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Longshoremen's Local
1367, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
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forced the Board's 8(b)(1)(A) judgment. 150 In Rubber Workers Local 12,
Judge Thornberry, speaking for a unanimous panel, declared that the duty
of fair representation which is implicit in the exclusive bargaining provision
of section 9(a) "comprises an indispensable element of the right of em-
ployees 'to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing'
as guaranteed in section 7. '"151 Hence, the court concluded that summarily
refusing to prosecute the black employees' grievances concerning seniority
and segregated job facilities restrained those employees in the exercise of
their section 7 rights in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).
15 2
The decisions in Miranda and Hughes Tool Co. represent the Board's
most auspicious patronage of the duty of fair representation. The ap-
plication of the Miranda rationale in Board cases has been far more con-
strained than originally anticipated by its critics. 1 53 Presently, the Board ap-
pears reluctant to rely on Miranda or to remedy an unfair representation
charge that fails to meet the traditional 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2) specifica-
tions.15 4  The Board, however, has fashioned an exception to this trend for
hiring hall or referral cases which include issues of discrimination against dis-
favored groups and for cases in which seniority lists of merged companies
are "endtailed" instead of being "dovetailed" with the larger successor em-
ployer's bargaining unit seniority scale.' 5 5 In two disassociated cases involv-
150. The court rendered a per curiam opinion in Local 1367 which cited its decision
of a month earlier in Rubber Workers Local 12.
151. 368 F.2d at 17.
152. See id.
153. See NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1963). See
also Bryson, supra note 48, at 1975-79 for a discussion of the Board's retreat from
Miranda.
154. See Bryson, supra note 48, at 1075. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local 577, 199
N.L.R.B. 37 (1972) (union's refusal to offer member a job referral because he filed
charge with Board against the union violated section 8(b) (1 ) (A)); San Jose Stereotyp-
ers' Local 120, 175 N.L.R.B. 1066 (1969) (union's refusal to place a nonmember em-
ployee transferred by the employer in a newly expanded operation effectively caused the
employee's discharge in violation of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2)); Carpenters Lo-
cal 143, 170 N.L.R.B. 746 (1968), enforced, 418 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1969) (union's
enforcement of geographical preference rule violated section 8(b) (1) (A)); Port Drum
Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 555 (1968) (Board refused to approve trial examiner's reliance on
Miranda in finding (8) (b) (1)(A) violation in union's refusal to file nonmember's griev-
ance).
155. When two separate 'bargaining units must be merged as a result of a consolida-
tion of formerly independent operations, the established seniority lists of the two groups
of employees must be combined into a single list. Because seniority often determines
critical terms of employment such as wage rates, eligibility for new positions, and the
order of layoffs when they become necessary, the method of consolidating the seniority
schedules chosen by the union which will represent the combined unit is a vital concern
of the employees in both groups. The customary method of combining the seniority
schedules is to "dovetail" them-that is, to place an employee on the consolidated list in
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ing the Pacific Maritime Association and separate locals of the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the Board registered its me-
chanical approval of the trial examiner's ruling that the unions' behavior in
operating their respective hiring halls constituted unfair labor practices. 156
The union in the earlier of these two cases, Longshoremen's Local 13,157
registered longshoremen as either A employees (fully registered long-
shoremen), B employees (limited registered longshoremen) or casuals.
Group A employees were given initial preference, followed by group
B employees, while casuals were referred only if all class A and class B long-
shoremen were already working. The union also employed a sponsorship ar-
rangement by which employees could only become class B registrants through
the sponsorship of a class A longshoreman. The trial examiner observed that
a union's actions with regard to employees must bear "a reasonable relation-
ship to its function as either the bargaining agent or as a labor organiza-
tion."'158 No such reasonable relationship was present, the examiner con-
cluded, where the union accorded registration to applicants because they hap-
pened to know a class A registrant and denied it to those who were unac-
quainted with a willing sponsor.' 59 Classification of applicants on such
an arbitrary and unfair basis, in the examiner's estimation, breached the
union's duty to refrain from conduct which adversely affects the employment
status of bargaining unit employees or applicants in violation of sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).
1 60
The discriminatory pattern in the most recent case, Pacific Maritime As-
sociation,'1' was devised with less imagination. The business agent of Long-
the position to which he is entitled based upon his starting time with either company.
Another method, which the Board and the courts disfavor, is to "endtail" the seniority
lists-that is, simply to tack the seniority list of the "merged" bargaining unit to the
bottom of the list of the "merging" unit. In so doing, all the employees in the "merged"
unit who have risen to the top of their independent seniority list lose the majority
of their seniority rights, becoming junior to the most recently hired members of the
"merging" bargaining unit. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Barton
Brands, Ltd., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 87 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1974); Teamsters Local 396, 203
N.L.R.B. No. 125, 83 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1973), enforced, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1975);
Truck Drivers Local 568, 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), enforced, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
156. In both cases, Member Fanning rearticulated his refusal to rely on Miranda in
reaching his conclusion that the unions' conduct violated sections 8(b) (1)(A) and 8(b)
(2).
157. 183 N.L.R.B. 221 (1970), affd on rehearing, 210 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 86
L.R.R.M. 1716 (1974).
158. 183 N.L.R.B. at 228.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 85 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974).
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shoremen's and Warehousemen's Local 52 refused to refer several women to
available waterfront employment through the union's exclusive hiring hall.
When questioned by the women, the agent declared that there were no jobs
on the waterfront on the Pacific Coast for women and that they would never
work there. Thereafter the women applicants, having spoken with the em-
ployer's condescending and equally dismayed area manager, filed unfair la-
bor practice charges with the Board. The trial examiner, whose opinion the
Board adopted, framed his ruling in the language of Miranda. Observing
that there were no grounds for drawing a distinction between discrimination
based on race and that based on sex, the examiner concluded that Local
52, by refusing to dispatch the women "upon the irrelevant, invidious and
unfair consideration of their sex, breached its duty of fair representation in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2).' '162 Largely because they both
simply echo the trial examiner's ruling, Local 13 and Pacific Maritime do
not constitute ringing endorsements of Miranda. However, even though both
decisions fail to fully illuminate the Board's current formula for ascertaining
a Miranda violation, they should create a viable precedent ,to be utilized by
aliens who have suffered invidious employment discrimination while seeking
work through a statutory representative's exclusive hiring hall.
A recent Board decision which viewed unfair representation as an unfair
labor practice, Barton Brands, Ltd.,'163 represents a more stalwart ratification
of the Miranda theory. A three member panel of the Board overruled, by
a 2-1 majority, a trial examiner's judgment that the union representing the
larger bargaining unit in a plant merger case did not engage in unfair labor
practices by placing the "merged" bargaining unit members at the bottom of
the new composite seniority scale. After surveying the Miranda rationale,
the Board declared that the union violated its duty to fairly represent all the
employees in the bargaining unit when it "endtailed" the "merged" employees
to advance the political cause of a union official facing a battle for re-elec-
tion.'6 4 The Board referred to its earlier decision in Truck Drivers Local
568165 in which it had approved a trial examiner's reliance on Miranda in
a similar plant merger fact pattern. In Local 568 the offending union prom-
ised members of its own larger bargaining unit that the seniority list of the
162. 85 L.R.R.M. at 1390-91. Member Fanning, concurring in the Board's judgment,
declined to rely solely on the rationale of Miranda. He asserted that because there was
no job related basis for the discrimination against women, the union's conduct underlined
its power to make employment dependent upon union membership. Furthermore, such
arbitrary union behavior, in his opinion, interfered with the prospective employee's sec-
tion 7 rights in violation of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2).
163. 213 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 87 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1974).
164. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1233.
165. 157 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1966), enforced, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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smaller "merged" unit would be "endtailed" with its own seniority scale to
assure that the union would receive enough votes from the larger unit to win
election against the rival representative of the smaller unit. In the view of
the examiner such arbitrary conduct, designed to assure the continuation of
the union's representative status, breached the union's duty of fair representa-
tion and violated section 8(b)(1)(A). 66 Observing that the duty of fair
representation is a constant obligation, the Board in Barton reaffirmed Local
568's utilization of Miranda in bargaining unit merger cases. This continu-
ing obligation, the Board noted, is violated when a certified representative
takes a position for partisan political reasons.' 67 The Board added that when
a bargaining representative "attempts to cause or does cause an employer to
derogate the employment status of an employee"'168 for such arbitrary or ir-
relevant reasons or on the basis of an unfair classification, that union as well
166. 157 N.L.R.B. at 1245. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit unanimously affirmed the decision in Local 568. The court observed
that the facts presented sufficient evidence for the Board properly to conclude that the
offending union's election conduct breached its obligation to represent fairly all employ-
ees in the unit. The primary issue which the court identified was whether the threat
of future action which clearly would violate the union's duty of fair representation con-
stituted an unfair labor practice. The court concluded that at the point the union com-
mitted itself to breach the duty of fair representation by "endtailing" the seniority lists,
it restrained the bargaining unit employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Sec-
tion 7, the court added, guaranteed employees a free choice, absent improper pressures,
in the selection of a bargaining agent. The union action, which prevented such a free
choice in this case, violated section 8(b)(1)(A). See 379 F.2d at 144-45.
167. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1233. The Board has also found a breach of the duty of fair
representation to have occurred in less egregious circumstances. In Teamsters Local
396, 203 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 83 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1973), enforced, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th
Cir. 1975), the union decided to "endtail" rather than "dovetail" the seniority designa-
tion of six employees who had been transferred to Local 396's geographical district by
the employer. The Board declared that the union's refusal to process grievances filed by
the transferees attacking the "endtailing" scheme constituted unfair representation in vio-
lation of section 8(b) (1) (A). Seeking to protect the seniority status of its own members,
Local 396 alleged that its conduct was supported by the collective bargaining agreement.
The Board determined that arbitration was the appropriate means of resolving the con-
flicting interpretation of the agreement as well as securing an impartial resolution of the
grievances. Additionally, the Board amplified its order by requiring the union to pay the
legal fees which would be incurred in the employees' retention of private counsel to rep-
resent them during the arbitration. A Ninth Circuit panel enforced the Board's order
granting attorney's fees. The court observed that the union's violation of its duty of fair
representation by its refusal to process the grievances prevented resolution of the issues
by litigation or arbitration during which the aggrieved employees would have been ac-
corded vigorous representation by a union sponsored representative. The court added that
in its judgment the aggrieved employees could only be restored to that position by being
unburdened of the expenses they would incur in obtaining the independent representation
to which they were entitled. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 396, 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.
1975).
168. Id. at 1232.
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as the cooperative employer violates sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(a)(1) and
8(a) (3) respectively.' 0"
Although it is likely that the Barton and Pacific Maritime decisions could
have been predicated on classic 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) formulations, the
Board's reliance on the notion that unfair representation constitutes an 8(b)
violation bodes well for disfavored alien employees. Perhaps the utilization
of a toned down Miranda rationale in these 1974 cases represents a metamor-
phosis in the Board's former inclination to completely eschew reliance on the
Miranda theory. But even if the transmutation does not radiate to other
types of employment discrimination, alien employees will find clear support
for a Miranda argument in the Board's race1'70 and sex' 7 ' discrimination deci-
sions. Since alienage, like race and unlike sex, has been denominated as a
suspect classification,' 7 2 the Board's adaptation of the Miranda rationale to
censure sex discrimination by unions presages a similar application of Mir-
anda to incidents of invidious union discrimination against aliens. The Mir-
anda rationale, though less dynamic now than at its inception, continues to
be an accessible stratagem by which to formulate a Board remedy for alien
employment discrimination.
2. International Longshoremen's Association Local 1581. The Board
was presented with a novel opportunity in Longshoremen's Local 1581173 to
adopt the Miranda rationale to remedy union employment discrimination
against aliens. In early September 1965, Elias Gonzalez Guerra was trans-
ferred at Local 1581's request from the dock and commodity department to
a lower paying job in the cotton compress and warehouse department. Dur-
169. Id. Member Fanning disagreed with the majority's judgment that the union had
derogated the job rights of the disfavored employees for arbitrary and irrelevant reasons.
Because a vast majority of workers favored the "endtailing" scheme, Member Fanning
contended that the union was acting honestly, in good faith and well within the
parameters of the "wide range of reasonableness" advanced by the Supreme Court in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Finding the evidence of partisan
political reasons for the union's conduct to 'be negligible, Member Fanning concluded
that the complaints should have been dismissed. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1235.
170. See, e.g., Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615 (1967), enforcement de-
nied on other grounds, 426 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1970); Longshoremen's Local 1367, 148
N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
837 (1967) (unions violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by rejecting black ap-
plicants who sought to be referred through exclusive hiring halls).
171. See, e.g., Glass Bottle Blowers Local 106, 210 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 86 L.R.R.M.
1257 (1974) (union breached duty of fair representation by maintaining separate locals
and separate grievance channels for each sex in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A));
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 85 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974) (see pp. 541-
42 supra).
172. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
173. 196 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1972), enforced, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ing contract negotiations earlier that year the union suggested, and the em-
ployer, Manchester Terminal Corporation, agreed, that job referrals through
the union's hiring hall would give preference first to United States citizens,
second to Mexican nationals with families residing in the United States, and
finally to Mexican nationals whose families remained in Mexico. Guerra,
who was a Mexican citizen and maintained his family in Mexico, was em-
ployed by Manchester in 1960 and worked in the preferred dock and com-
modity department for two years before his demotion was sought by the
union. Guerra was informed by Local 1581 that he would not be eligible
for permanent employment in the dock and commodity facility unless he be-
came a United States citizen or moved his family from Mexico. Local 158 1's
contract included a hospitalization plan for the employee and his family.
The union membership had voted earlier for a proposal that required every
employee in the dock and commodity department to be a person whose family
was also eligible to receive benefits from the hospitalization plan. Guerra,
however, was not afforded an opportunity to express his interest in the
union's decision because, as an alien who had yet to declare an intention to
become a United States citizen, he was ineligible for union membership.
Following his demotion, Guerra filed unfair labor practice charges with the
Board. The Board issued a complaint but the trial examiner recommended
that it be dismissed because Local 1581's desire to maximize benefits from
its hospitalization plan justified the request for Guerra's transfer.174  The
Board disagreed. While doubting the importance of the hospitalization plan
in the union's solicitation of Guerra's transfer, the Board asserted that the
union's conduct could only work to the detriment of noncitizens. The cir-
cumstances of Guerra's demotion convinced the Board that Local 1581 "dis-
criminated against Guerra because he was a noncitizen who refused to bring
his family to this country."'175 Noting that the Supreme Court has consis-
tently refused to acknowledge any distinction between citizens and resident
aliens, 176 the Board reasoned that Guerra's alienage and the residence of his
family abroad did not constitute legitimate grounds for his demotion. With-
174. Id.
175. Id. The Board observed that the union, in reply to Guerra's protest of his trans-
fer, did not mention the hospitalization plan, but instead offered to help Guerra move
his family to the United States.
176. The Board cited Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditius, 398 U.S. 306, 309 n.5 (1970)
(in permitting an alien seaman to recover for injuries received on a Greek ship, the
Court declared that aliens are to be extended the same constitutional protections that are
accorded citizens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945). (In nullifying a depor-
tation order filed against a labor union president based on his alleged Communist Party
affiliation, the Court observed that no distinction could be made between citizens and
aliens where inalienable constitutional privileges were concerned.)
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out mentioning Miranda, the three member Board panel declared that the
termination or transfer of an employee to satisfy a statutory representative
encourages membership in that union and "stands as a warning to employees
that the favor and goodwill of responsible union officials is to be nurtured
and sustained.' 77 Based on this reasoning, the Board concluded that Local
1581 violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). Additionally, the Board
announced that Local 1581's creation and implementation of a job referral
system in which citizens are preferred over aliens was alone sufficient to vio-
late sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). 178 Since preferences were distrib-
uted only to citizens eligible for union membership instead of all employees,
the Board added that the procedure undoubtedly encouraged union member-
ship in violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). 179
Although a union's decision to negotiate a contract provision which unrea-
sonably discriminates against the employment status of aliens would seem to
constitute unfair representation, the Board evaded any adaptation of Miranda
to remedy the union's treatment of Guerra. The use of a duty of fair repre-
sentation analysis in Local 1581 was presumably made unnecessary by the
egregious nature of the union's conduct which made suitable the diagnosis
of a "pure" 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) infraction. By creating a preferential
referral system which favored United States citizens over two classifications
of aliens for the higher paying dock and commodity department jobs, the
union translated citizenship into a criterion for employment opportunities.
Local 1581 therefore endeavored to use forbidden economic power against
aliens to influence other employees to support the union in exchange for pri-
ority referral to the dock and commodity jobs from which the aliens had been
excluded, as well as the higher paying jobs to which aliens with greater sen-
iority status would have ordinarily acceded. Moreover, the union's prefer-
ential job placement scheme, which made it incumbent upon aliens to become
citizens in order to eliminate both their disqualification from the dock and
commodity positions and their ineligibility for union membership, violated the
Board's conception of section (8) (b) (2). In the Board's judgment, Local
1581's conduct was literally union oriented in that it reinforced close associa-
tion with the union and its policies.
A unanimous Fifth Circuit panel enforced the Board's decision.1 80 The
Court's analysis was fabricated upon the Supreme Court's formulation of the
elements constituting a section 8(b)(2) violation which the Court articulated
177. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1187.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974).
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in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB.18' According to the Radio Officers ra-
tionale, the Fifth Circuit panel observed that an 8(b)(2) violation occurs
when the statutory representative engages in "impermissible discrimination"
which "causes or tends to result in the encouragement or discouragement of
union membership.' 1 82 The court agreed that there was substantial evidence
to support a finding that Local 1581 impermissibly discriminated against
alien employees in negotiating and enforcing a referral system which kept
aliens in the lowest paying departments of the employer's operation. Per-
haps the most blatant discriminatory conduct, the court noted, was the union's
reliance on a classification based on alienage for job referrals. Such a classi-
fication has been identified by the Supreme Court as "inherently suspect and
subject to close judicial scrutiny."' 8  Since Local 1581 had no compelling
reason to legitimize the classification, the court asserted that the union's con-
duct was arbitrary and invidious and therefore constituted an impermissible
discrimination when it caused Guerra's transfer because he was an alien.
Without acknowledging the Board's hesitance to utilize Miranda, the Fifth
Circuit panel effectively superimposed the Miranda 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) theory
upon the Board's decision in Local 1581. Borrowing substantially from
Judge Friendly's dissent from the Second Circuit's refusal to enforce the
Board's Miranda opinion,' 84 the Fifth Circuit described section 8(b)(2) as
being concerned not only with union discrimination based on membership
considerations, but also with union-induced employer discrimination on the
"basis of any invidious or arbitrary classification"'' 85 such as alienage. The
court then completed its Radio Officers' analysis, declaring that the statutory
representative's exercise of power, .to cause an employer -to discriminate for
such individous reasons, is likely to intimidate employees who would other-
wise refrain from union membership or from engaging in any extensive union
activity.' 86
The Fifth Circuit's application of the Miranda 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) doctrine
in Local 1581 was recently reinforced by an unprecedented ratification of
that unique rationale under circumstances virtually identical to those existing
in Miranda itself. In Kling v. NLRB,187 the Ninth Circuit was confronted
181. 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (specific proof of intent unnecessary for an 8(b)(2)-8(a)
(3) violation where conduct of employer which has been sought by union will fore-
seeably result in encouraging or discouraging union membership).
182. 489 F.2d at 637.
183. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
184. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 180-86 (2d Cir. 1963).
185. 489 F.2d at 637.
186. Id. at 638.
187. 509 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1975).
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with an employee's allegation that he was placed at the bottom of the senior-
ity scale as a result of the union's arbitrary and invidious action against him
because he had taken an extended leave of absence. The employee, Kaj
Kling, a veteran machinist and union member, requested in writing and was
granted a leave of absence by the employer, which he twice extended with
the employer's permission. The employer informed the union of its decision
to approve Kling's leave of absence as well as the two extensions. The union
objected to the leave of absence and demanded that Kling be placed at the
bottom of the seniority scale. When the employer reminded the union that
the collective bargaining agreement was silent on leaves of absence, the
union altered its position and contended that, although the original leave of
absence may have been proper, the two extensions were improperly granted.
After returning to work and being informed that he had been placed at the
foot of the seniority ladder, Kling filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the union alleging that it had caused his constructive discharge through its
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of his job rights. The administrative
law judge concluded that the union, in reducing Kling's seniority, had acted
arbitrarily in violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). The Board,
however, overruled the trial examiner in a terse opinion in which it held that
the union's conduct was entirely reasonable under the circumstances. 1 8
A Ninth Circuit panel unanimously disagreed. Referring to its similar facts
and "compelling argument," the court declared that Miranda, which
had received favorable notice from the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes,, 89
controlled the result in Kling.' 90 The various "flimsy reasons" with which
the union attempted to buttress its decision to revoke Kling's seniority were
insufficient, in the court's view, to forestall the conclusion that the union had
contravened its duty of fair representation.' 91 Disappointingly, the court
simply made a superficial application of the Miranda holding without en-
deavoring to examine its important internal components. The court ne-
glected to document the "compelling" nature of the Miranda 8(b)(2)-
8(a)(3) doctrine which it found so convincing and failed to provide any ra-
tionale for the doctrine's newly resurgent viability.
188. Machinists' Lodge 68, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 84 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1973). The
Board reasoned that a union may legitimately seek to limit leaves of absence of an em-
ployee who while on leave retains an absolute right to return to his job and accumulates
seniority, since presumably he will be allowed to bump the employee assigned to
do his job while he was away and will have accumulated, during his absence, seniority
and superior job rights over other employees who have been actively at work while he
was out on personal business. 84 L.R.R.M. at 1032.
189. See 386 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1967).
190. 88 L.R.R.M. at 2385-86.
191. See id. at 2386.
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Both the Fifth Circuit, in applying Miranda's 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) doctrine
to remedy Guerra's unfavorable treatment by Local 1581, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in using the same rationale to recompense Kling for the damages he suf-
fered through the arbitrary revocation of his seniority, employed a theory
which had never before been approved by any federal court.19 2 Similar to
the early refusal of the courts to utilize Miranda, the Board, shortly after pos-
iting the 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) theory in Miranda, became disinclined to rely
upon this component of the decision,193 and has only recently subscribed to
its reactivation. 9 4  The Board's and the courts' preliminary aversion to em-
ploying the 8(b) (2)-8(a) (3) notions of Miranda appears to be traceable -to
uncertainty regarding the kind of discrimination which these sections were in-
tended to prohibit. The Board took the view in its Twenty-Third Annual
Report in 1959 that discrimination in the 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) sense results
only from an arbitrary classification or discriminatory conduct against em-
ployees because they engaged in activities protected by section 7.195 This
position was corroborated by the Supreme Court's declaration in Radio Of-
ficers' that sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) do not prohibit all discrimination
in employment, but "only such discrimination as encourages or discourages
membership in a labor organization."' 196 However, in Local 1581, the Fifth
Circuit presumed that "any" invidious or arbitrary classification constitutes
the type of discrimination condemned by sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3).197
The Board, in assuming a similar position in both Pacific Maritime and Bar-
ton Brands now contends that when a statutory representative influences an
employer "to derogate the employment status of an employee for arbitrary
or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification,"'1 98 the
union and employer have violated sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) respec-
tively.
192. The Fifth Circuit approved the Board's reliance upon a breach of the duty of
fair representation to establish an 8(b)(1)(A) violation in Rubber Workers Local 12
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), and NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1367, 368
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), but declined to rule on the Board's 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) finding.
The Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's original holding that unfair represen-
tation constituted a violation of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) in NLRB v. Miranda
Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
193. The Board, prior to relying on Miranda in the 1974 cases, last invoked the
Miranda 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) analysis in Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615
(1967), enforcement denied, 426 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1970).
194. See Barton Brands, Ltd., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 87 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1974);
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 85 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974).
195. See note 134 supra. Discrimination related to section 7 conduct (concerted ac-
tivities) constitutes a "pure" 8(b)(2)-8(a) (3) violation.
196. 347 U.S. at 43.
197. 489 F.2d at 637.
198. 87 L.R.R.M. at 1232.
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The Board's chameleon-like posture toward cases which include issues of
invidious classifications as well as allegations of discrimination based upon
union status does not facilitate a pragmatic analysis of the Board's current
8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) sentiments. In Local 1581, the Board found a "pure"
8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) violation because the statutory representative relied upon
the unreasonable classification of alienage to deny Guerra both employment
opportunities and union membership. Nevertheless, under similar circum-
stances, the Board held in Pacific Maritime that the union's refusal to refer
nonmember women applicants solely because of their sex constituted unfair
representation and an 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) violation as identified by Miranda.
Yet as Member Jenkins observed in his concurring opinion, 199 Pacific Mari-
time could have been decided on a Miranda theory. Thus, the two 8(b)(2)-
8(a)(3) theories of "discrimination" merge when the employee, while not
being permitted to join the union, is unreasonably discriminated against in
employment opportunities on the basis of an invidious classification contrived
by the union.
The Board's utilization of both the "pure" and the Miranda 8(b)(2)-
8(a) (3) rationales, while failing to constitute a reconciliation in their oppos-
ing views of "discrimination," will be advantageous to disfavored alien em-
ployees because the Board now has contemporary precedents upon which to
structure a favorable decision under either theory. However, the more difficult
question arises when the alien who is victimized by invidious union employ-
ment discrimination is a union member. Such a case is not susceptible to res-
olution under the tenets of the "pure" 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) rationale because
there is no distinction being made by the offending union based upon mem-
bership considerations. There remains, nevertheless, a clear breach of the
duty of fair representation when a statutory representative denies employ-
ment opportunities to union employees simply because they are aliens. A
situation not unlike this recently confronted the Board in Barton Brands.
The statutory representative in Barton, Local 23 of the Distillery Workers,
represented the employees of two distilleries which had been merged into a
single operation. In "endtailing" rather than "dovetailing" the separate se-
niority lists of the two bargaining units, the union violated its duty of fair
representation despite the fact that the persons whose employment rights suf-
fered derogation were also union members. Thus, where union membership
considerations were not at issue, the Board turned to Miranda to establish
-that a union's unfair representation of its members in causing the employer
to injure their employment status violates sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3).
199. 85 L.R.R.M. 1389, 1391-92.
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Regardless of an alien employee's union status, therefore, discriminatory
conduct perpetrated by the union, which derogates the alien's job rights or
opportunities based simply on his alienage, is an unfair labor practice.
Where an invidious alienage classification is used by a statutory representa-
tive to prohibit union membership as well as to provide the basis for hiring,
referring or promoting employees, an aggrieved alien may rely either upon
the Board's "pure" 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) holding in Local 1581, or upon the
unfair representation 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) violation delineated by the Board in
Pacific Maritime and by -the Fifth Circuit in Local 1581. The outcome is not
reversed when the alien employee who has been victimized by discriminatory
conduct because of his alienage is also a union -member. Miranda and Bar-
ton Brands plainly establish that a statutory representative and an employer
violate sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) respectively when the union encour-
ages the employer to derogate the employment status of an employee irre-
spective of his union affiliation for arbitrary reasons, or upon an unfair classi-
fication such as alienage.
3. Employer Unfair Labor Practices. Most major advancements in the
Board's effort to thwart employment discrimination have related to restrain-
ing union policies which encourage job discrimination against blacks, aliens
and other minority groups. Such a concentration on regulating union behavior
is not surprising when one observes that the Board, by implementing the col-
lective bargaining policies of ,the NLRA, inflates the power of labor unions
with statutory authority until the unions attain the capacity to bargain profit-
ably with the autonomous employer. Hence, because the Board constitu-
tionally cannot permit a labor organization which it patronizes to use its au-
thority to promote invidious employment discrimination, the Board has for-
mulated several previously discussed methods to derail union employment
discrimination. However, when the employer unilaterally engages in dis-
criminatory employment practices, the Board lacks a constitutional obliga-
tion to regulate the employer's conduct. Rather than imparting govern-
mental authority upon employers, the NLRA has usurped portions of their
traditional power. Thus, the Board cannot be held to be constitutionally re-
sponsible for the independent discriminatory acts of employers. Absent any
constitutional accountability for independent employer job discrimination,
Board involvement in such cases therefore must be countenanced by the stat-
utory policies of the NLRA. 200 The Act, however, does not exhibit a special
solicitude toward remedying independent employer discrimination against ali-
ens or other minorities. The primary authority for the Board's interest in
200. See Leiken, The Current and Potential Equal Employment Role of the NLRB,
1971 DUKE L.J. 833, 863.
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employer discrimination cases is the Act's policy of chaperoning the utiliza-
tion of concerted activities by disadvantaged employees.
201
Concerted activities by employees, especially when directed against dis-
criminatory employer practices, may transpire at the direction of the union
after consideration of its alternatives under the contract, or such employee
conduct may be carried out by individual workers without union support. In
the latter situation, the Board has generally approved the use of concerted
activities by individual employees, independent of union participation, when
the conduct is consistent with prevailing union objectives. 20 2  Nevertheless,
when the union has already taken measures to protest employer discrimina-
tion, the Board will refuse to protect individual employees who engage in con-
certed activity designed to curtail an employer's discriminatory employment
practices. 203  This distinction was recently accorded the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization.20 4 The Court was confronted with the question of whether the
NLRA, in light of the national labor policy against discrimination in employ-
ment, sanctions concerted activity by minority employees designed to force
the employer to bargain over issues of employment discrimination.
20
1
The minority employees in Emporium presented the union with complaints
of racial discrimination in the employer's assignment and promotion practices
which the union investigated and shortly thereafter agreed to process ,through
arbitration. Several employees, however, viewed the arbitration procedures
201. See id. at 873.
202. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967), vacated and remanded,
419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). The Board assumed that the union's objectives were
similar to those of the picketing employee because disagreement with their goal of elim-
inating discriminatory employer hiring practices would have been an unlawful breach of
the union's duty of fair representation. The Ninth Circuit, however, in repudiating the
Board's opinion, declared that the legitimacy of independent concerted activity by em-
ployees was contingent upon specific union authorization. 419 F.2d at 221. See also
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969).
203. See Emporium & Western Addition Community Organization, 192 N.L.R.B. 173
(1971), aff'd, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,
420 U.S. 50 (1975), rev'g Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485
F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
204. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
205. See id. at 52. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit resolved the issue by proposing a standard for distinguishing between protected
and unprotected conduct. The court directed the Board to inquire whether the union in
such a case was actually remedying the employment discrimination "to the fullest extent
possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means." Western Addition Community
Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court added that when
the union's efforts fail to meet the high standard, the minority employees' concerted ac-
tivity remains within the protective framework of section 7. Id.
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as inadequate and began picketing the store to protest the discriminatory
treatment as well as to force Emporium's president to bargain with them on
the issues. The company's president, while refusing to bargain directly with
the dissident employees, terminated their employment following a written
warning that repetition of the picketing would lead to their discharge.
In moving toward its conclusion that the disputed employee conduct was
unprotected by the NLRA, the Court reexamined the exclusivity principle
of section 9(a) of the Act.200  Central to the successful operation of the na-
tional policy of collective bargaining, the Court observed, is the principle of
majority rule established by section 9(a).20 7 Despite the collective strength
and bargaining power secured by majority rule, the Court noted that Con-
gress did not authorize a "tyranny of the majority over minority interests. '208
Rather, in enacting the NLRA Congress sought to limit the majority regime
by requiring bargaining units which were appropriately structured to ensure
that a commonality of interest existed among the employees. Finally, the
Court added that implicit in the nature of the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative's status as representative of all employees, is the congressionally im-
posed duty of fair and good faith representation of minority interests which
had received the Court's endorsement in Vaca v. Sipes,2 9 a violation of
which had been identified as an unfair labor practice by the Board in
Miranda Fuel Co.
210
Implying that these already existing limitations on section 9(a)'s exclusive
representation principle were sufficient, the Court refused to fashion an addi-
tional qualification which would permit dissident employees to bargain directly
with the employer over discriminatory employment practices. The Court's
rationale for this refusal was twofold. First, the concept of separate bar-
gaining, instead of promoting the elimination of discriminatory employment
practices, in the Court's view, would have the effect of compelling competi-
tion among minority groups, setting one against the other in a struggle to
force the employer to meet their separate demands. Secondly, such self-
destructive conduct, the Court reasoned, is not essential to the actualization
of the primary national labor policy of nondiscrimination and would severely
jeopardize the union's considerable interest in an orderly collective bargaining
206. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
207. 420 U.S. at 62.
208. Id. at 64.
209. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court also cited Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S.
248 (1948).
210. See 420 U.S. at 64-65. The Court also referred to Hughes Tool Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964), in articulating the most explicit endorsement yet made of these
controversial Board decisions.
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process. 211 A union, the Court declared, has a "legitimate interest in pre-
senting a united front on [issues of employer discrimination] as on other
issues and in not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by
subgroups within the unit separately pursuing what they see as separate inter-
ests. ''212  Furthermore, the Court concluded that the principle of exclusive
representation which was designed to facilitate the collective bargaining proc-
ess would be gravely and unnecessarily compromised if such separate bar-
gaining were permitted. 2
13
The Court's Emporium decision makes clear sense. The effort by minority
group employees to carve an exception from the section 9(a) exclusive bar-
gaining rationale for separate bargaining on issues of employer discrimination
could have created an intense competition among various groups within the
bargaining unit which would plainly decimate the union's "united front" and
result in a deflation of the union's bargaining position vis- -vis the employer.
Under such circumstances, the pre-NLRA tactics of "divide and conquer"
would be an irresistable temptation for employers. The mechanism of collec-
tive bargaining which depends upon a "clash of equals" would be dangerously
undermined. Moreover, it is likely that a plethora of complicated standards
governing a separate bargaining exception would be unworkable and incap-
able of redressing the consequent damage to the collective bargaining proc-
ess. 214  Emporium, however, is not without obvious benefits to -alien and
other minority workers. The Court, while explicitly endorsing the duty of fair
representation as a safety valve, gives Miranda a far more straightforward
ratification than any previous decision. Although aliens must combat em-
ployer discrimination under the auspices of the union, the Board will have
clear Supreme Court authority upon which to rest a conclusion that a union's
failure to bargain diligently to obviate an employer's discriminatory conduct
against aliens not only exemplifies unfair representation but constitutes an
unfair labor practice.
211. See 420 U.S. at 65-70.
212. Id. at 70.
213. Id. Justice Douglas dissented. Asserting that the minority employees were en-
gaged in a traditional form of labor protest protected by section 7, Justice Douglas de-
clared that the employees' right to nondiscriminatory treatment does not depend upon
exclusive union demands but is based in law. While individual employees could reason-
ably be required to approach the union before resorting to concerted activity, he con-
tended that they should not be held prisoner by an inadequate union response but should
be permitted to engage in independent concerted activity. Id. at 75-76.
214. Although the Court's opinion discusses the existence of grievance procedures as
an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of employer discrimination issues, the ex-
istence of arbitration machinery does not appear to be a prerequisite to the Court's con-
demnation of separate bargaining by employees.
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Unions which seek to fulfill their fair representation obligation to alleviate
an employer's discrimination against aliens through bargaining or concerted
activity will receive the support of the Board. In Packinghouse Workers v.
NLRB, 215 substantial evidence of unilateral employer discrimination against
black and Latin American employees was presented. The union, through
contract negotiations, sought to eliminate the abusive conditions which greatly
favored "Anglo" employees. The employer remained obstinate in an attempt
to dissipate the union's bargaining position by interrogating employees, prom-
ising them more advantageous employment conditions if they refrained from
striking, and unilaterally granting the employees a paid holiday and a ten
percent pay increase. Together with the employer's unilateral wage hike and
allocation of a paid holiday, which truncated the bargaining process, the
Board determined that the employer's refusal to bargain over the abolish-
ment of discriminatory employment practices constituted a breach of the em-
ployer's duty to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5). 218
The Court of Appeals for 'the District of Columbia Circuit not only en-
forced the Board's 8(a)(5) finding, it found that an employer's invidious
discrimination inhibits its victims from asserting themselves against the em-
ployer to improve ,the terms and conditions of -their employment. 21 7  The
court contended that employment discrimination against minority groups cre-
ates an unjustified clash of interests among groups of workers which would
encourage a reduction in their ability to work together to achieve legitimate
objectives. Similarly, discrimination creates an apathy or docility in its vic-
tims which interferes with the assertion of their rights against the offending
employer. 218  The court then concluded that "the confluence of these two
factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7 rights as to violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1)."219  The court remanded the case to the Board for hearings
on whether the employer engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination
against minority groups.
However, the Board was unreceptive to the court's novel remedy for em-
ployer discrimination against minority group workers. On remand it found
that the employer in Packinghouse had not engaged in a pattern and practice
of discrimination. 220  Thereafter, in Jubilee Manufacturing Co., 2 21 the Board
215. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
216. See Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968).
217. 416 F.2d at 1135.
218. See id.
219. Id. (emphasis in original). The court did not refer to any case law in reaching
this conclusion but relied instead on sociological data which tended to establish the the-
ory that illegal discrimination induces docility in the target groups which would prevent
the effective assertion of the groups' section 7 rights. See 416 F.2d at 1136-38.
220. See Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971) (supplemental de-
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articulated its disagreement with the Packinghouse rationale. Employment
discrimination against minority groups standing alone, the Board declared, "is
not 'inherently destructive' of employees' Section 7 rights and therefore is not
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.' '222  Furthermore, denying
that apathy or docility are the only contingent results of employer discrimina-
tion, the Board directed that there must be actual evidence of "a nexus be-
tween the alleged discriminatory conduct and the interference with, or re-
straint of employees in the exercise of those rights protected by the Act. ' 223
The Board in Jubilee constructed a fine but significant distinction between
the existence of employment discrimination per se which the Board asserted
was not proscribed by the Act, and the utilization of concerted activity to
combat such discrimination, which the Board acknowledged was protected by
the Act. While the Jubilee holding seems superficially contradictory, the
Board was simply seeking to prevent the reading of an anti-discrimination
clause into the Act. The Board observed that employment discrimination
certainly does directly affect the terms and conditions of employment but that
the NLRA itself does not act in a prophylactic manner to obviate it. Rather,
it sanctions the use of concerted activity as a means of convincing the em-
ployer to eliminate his discriminatory practices.
224
III. CONCLUSION
Jubilee in conjunction with Emporium explicates the Board's attitude to-
ward manners of alleviating independent employer discrimination against
aliens and other minority groups. Aliens who are victimized by employer
discrimination must initially act through their bargaining representative. If
the union fulfills its duty to fairly represent alien employees through arbitra-
tion or negotiation with the employer regarding discriminatory practices, the
cision). While recognizing the employer's initial indifference to the need to upgrade
the employment opportunities of minority employees, the Board refused to hold that the
employer had engaged in invidious discrimination because he had failed to initiate an
affirmative action program.
221. 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Because employment discrimination is not outlawed by the NLRA, the Board
cannot order the employer to rectify his procedures. Even though it has the authority
under section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), to force the employer to bargain
over the discrimination issue, the Board cannot require the employed to yield on this
or any other issue. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), directs that neither party
shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or to make a concession. This principle was
confirmed by the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)




Board will protect the employees from deprivation of their job rights where
they engage in union-sponsored concerted activity designed to bring economic
pressure upon the employer. 225 If the union refuses to seek a contract or
negotiated remedy to eliminate employer discrimination, alien workers may
then bring an action in court or a charge with the Board alleging that the
union's refusal to arbitrate or bargain for the abolishment of discriminatory
employer practices constitutes unfair representation. 22
6
As observed earlier, the utilization of NLRA remedies is not confined
to eliminating discrimination by employers. Provisions of the Act, as en-
forced by the Board, substantially encourage equal employment practices by
both unions and employers. The Board has often utilized its options of set-
ting aside elections, refusing enforcement of the contract bar rule, and revok-
ing certification or refusing to certify unions which engage in discrimination
against minority workers. The revival of the Board's Miranda rationale,
which declared that unfair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice,
bears great potential for reeducating unions which attempt to promote the
interests of white native workers over those of alien employees for insubstan-
tial reasons. Aliens who are also discriminated against by unions in the oper-
ation of exclusive hiring halls or by virtue of a merger of two previously sep-
arate bargaining units may rely on Board decisions which specifically identify
such conduct as both unfair representation and an unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, the decisions in Local 1581 and Kling demonstrate that -the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have endorsed the Miranda rationale and will pre-
sumably, therefore, not hesitate to condemn unfair union representation of
alien employees. The NLRA plainly provides the courts and the Board with
comprehensive tools for remedying employment discrimination upon which
aliens victimized by employment discrimination may justifiably rely.
Scott Alan Smith
225. See Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 273 (1973).
226. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 65-66 (1975).
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